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INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION AND THE POLLUTION OF THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT 
Prof. Dr. Frank Smeele 
1. Introduction 
1. Whenever a major accident occurs to a ship – whether a fire or an explosion on board 
of the ship, or a collision with another ship, or the ship running aground or sinking and beco-
ming a wreck – it is likely that this casualty will result in considerable physical damage to the 
ship and its cargo, and in some cases also in loss of life or personal injury to crew members 
and passengers aboard the ship. Obviously this may have huge financial implications for par-
ties interested in ship and cargo and for crew members, passengers and their relatives. How-
ever a maritime casualty not only affects parties involved in the ship’s operation but also 
third parties. Depending on the circumstances of the incident and the nature of the resulting 
damage, (many) third parties from various countries are likely to suffer losses as well. A few 
examples may help to draw the picture. States may be affected e.g. if wreck removal and 
clean-up operations become necessary, but also the financial interests and livelihoods of pri-
vate individuals and businesses, such as local hotels and restaurants who lose earnings from 
tourists when the coast line becomes covered by a thick layer of crude oil or fisheries who 
temporarily or permanently lose access to their fishing grounds. Indirectly, the financial inte-
rests of many more parties will be affected by the disaster as its consequences ripple on 
through the local and national economy. This group includes the sub-buyers and final users 
of the goods, as well as underwriters, whether Hull and Machinery (H&M) underwriters or 
Protection & Indemnity (P&I) insurers of the ship or marine cargo underwriters. 
2. Besides the multitude of interests likely to be affected by a maritime casualty invol-
ving a ship, there is also a potential for exceptional financial losses resulting from it. It was 
reported in 2008 that the costs of clean-up operations in Alaska following the Exxon Valdez 
oil spill in 1989 had reached the figure of US$ 3,5 Billion and still counting. But not only oil 
tankers and ships carrying other hazardous cargoes are capable of generating such enor-
mous losses. Modern container vessels with over 12,000 TEU capacity may easily have car-
goes on board worth hundreds of millions of Euros, as is illustrated by the fires involving the 
m.v. “Hanjin Pennsylvania” in 2002 and the m.v. “Hyundai Fortune” in 2006, and the volun-





2. Limitation conventions 
3. Obviously, this extreme potential for damage entails the risk that the ship-owner will 
be held liable to compensate all of these losses in full. It was in order to protect the shipping 
industry against this extreme liability exposure that the notion of limitation of liability of the 
ship-owner was first developed.1 The basic idea is that in case of a maritime disaster invol-
ving his ship, a ship-owner is to be released from all his liabilities to anyone, if he puts a limi-
ted amount of money, the fund, at the disposal of his joint creditors.  
4. Originally, this privilege was granted to ship-owners under national law, but as from 
1924 a variety of international conventions dealing with limitation of liability of the ship-ow-
ner has come into being.2 These conventions can be divided in two groups, i.e. on the one 
hand the limitation conventions of more or less general application, which are: 
– 1924 Brussels Convention3, 
– 1957 Brussels Convention4, 
– 1979 Protocol to the 1957 Convention5, 
– 1976 London Convention (LLMC)6, 
– 1996 LLMC as amended by the 1996 Protocol7, 
– 1988 Strasbourg Convention (CLNI)8. 
                                                             
1  For a comparative history of the ship-owner’s right to limitation of liability under German, French, En-
glish and American law, see: P.K. Sotiropoulos, Die Beschränkung der Reederhaftung, diss. Hamburg, 
1962. See also: J.J. Donovan, ‘The origins and developments of limitation of shipowner’s liability’, Tulane 
Law Review 54 (1979) No. 4, p. 1000 
2  For an up-to-date overview of the dates of entry into force and the status as to ratifications of various 
limitation conventions, see: http://www.imo.org under the heading Conventions, “Status of Conven-
tions Summary” and “Status of Conventions by Country”. 
3  International convention for the unification of certain rules relating to the limitation of the liability of 
owners of sea-going vessels, Brussels 25.8.1924, International Transport Treaties, ed. by J.E. de Boer, 
Kluwer, Deventer (Looseleaf) I-23 seq. (cited: ITT). The 1924 Convention entered into force on 2 June 
1931. 
4  International convention relating to the limitation of the liability of owners of sea-going ships, Brussels, 
10.10.1957, ITT, I-76 ff. The 1957 Convention entered into force on 31.5.1968. 
5  Protocol amending the International convention relating to the limitation of the liability of owners of 
sea-going ships dated 10 October 1957, Brussels 21.12.1979, ITT, I-309 ff. 
6  Convention on limitation of liability for maritime claims, London, 19.11.1976, ITT, I-247 ff. LLMC 1976 
entered into force on 1 December 1986 and as per 28.2.2009 had 52 contracting states, representing 
49.08 % of the world’s shipping tonnage. Based on information provided by the U.N. International Mari-
time Organization (IMO) on its website: www.imo.org/Conventions Summary of status of Conventions. 
7  Protocol of 1996 to amend the convention on limitation of liability for maritime claims, 1976, London, 
2.5.1996, ITT, I-561 ff. The LLMC 1996 entered into force on 13.5.2004 and already has 34 contracting 
states representing 35.48% of world tonnage. 
8  Strasbourg convention on the limitation of liability of owners of inland navigation vessels (CLNI), 4.11. 
1988, ITT, II-87 ff. CLNI 1988 entered into force on 1.9.1997 and has 4 contracting states. 
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and on the other hand the conventions in relation to the civil liability and/or limitation of lia-
bility and/or compensation of specific types of damage (hereafter to be called: special con-
ventions), which are:  
– 1969 Civil liability convention for oil pollution damage (CLC)9, 
– 1976 CLC as amended by the 1976 Protocol (CLC 1976)10, 
– 1992 CLC as amended by the 1992 Protocol (CLC 1992)11, 
– 1971 International Fund Convention (IFC)12, 
– 1976 IFC as amended by the 1976 Protocol (IFC 1976)13, 
– 1992 IFC as amended by the 1992 Protocol (IFC 1992)14, 
– 2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol to IFC15, 
– 1989 Civil liability convention carriage of dangerous goods by road, rail and in-
land navigation vessels (CRTD)16, 
– 1996 Liability convention for hazardous and noxious substances (HNS)17, 
– 2001 Civil liability convention for bunker oil pollution damage (Bunker)18, 
– 2007 Wreck Removal Convention (WRC).19 
5. A remarkable common feature of this second group of conventions is that whilst re-
cognizing20 the principle of limitation of liability by the ship-owner, these conventions also 
                                                             
9  Brussels, 29.11.1969, ITT, I-167 ff. CLC 1969 entered into force on 19.6.1975 and as per 31.3.2009 still 
has 38 contracting states representing 2.89% of world tonnage. 
10  London, 19.11.1976, ITT, I-265 ff. CLC 1976 entered into force on 8.4.1981 and as per 31.3.2009 has 53 
contracting states representing 56.41% of world tonnage. 
11  London, 27.11.1992, ITT, I-459 ff. It is worth observing that the Protocol to amend CLC of 25.5.1984, ITT, 
I-355 ff. did never enter into force. CLC 1992 entered into force on 30.5.1996 and as per 31.3.2009 has 
no less than 121 contracting states representing 96.39% of world tonnage. 
12  International convention on the establishment of an international fund for compensation for oil pollu-
tion damage, London, 18.12.1971, ITT, I-185 ff. IFC 1971 entered into force on 16.10.1978. After many 
denunciations as per 31.3.2009 it has 20 contracting states left. CMI Yearbook 2007-2008, p. 440 ff. 
13  London, 19.11.1976, ITT, I-268 ff. IFC 1976 entered into force on 22.11.1994 and as per 31.3.2009 has 31 
contracting states representing 47.33% of world tonnage. 
14  London, 27.11.1992, ITT, I-476 ff. IFC 1992 entered into force on 30.5.1996 and as per 31.3.2009 has 103 
contracting states representing 94.12% of world tonnage. 
15  Protocol of 2003 to the international convention on the establishment of an international fund for com-
pensation for oil pollution damage 1992, London, 16.5.2003, ITT, I-711 ff. The Supplementary Fund Pro-
tocol 2003 entered into force on 3.3.2005 and as per 31.3.2009 has 23 contracting states representing 
19.84% of world tonnage. 
16  Convention on civil liability for damage caused during carriage of dangerous goods by road, rail, and in-
land navigation vessels (CRTD), Geneva 10.10.1989, ITT IV-81 ff. CRTD 1989 has not entered into force. 
17  International convention on liability and compensation for damage in connection with the carriage of 
hazardous and noxious substances by sea, London, 3.5.1996, ITT, I-573 ff. HNS 1996 has not yet entered 
into force despite 13 ratifications of states representing 13.64% of world tonnage as per 31.3.2009. 
18  International convention on civil liability for bunker oil pollution damage, London, 23.3.2001, ITT, I-655 
ff. Bunkers 2001 recently entered into force on 21.11.2008 and as per 31.3.2009 already has 38 contrac-
ting states representing 75.50% of world tonnage. 
19  International convention on the removal of wrecks, Nairobi 18.5.2007, ITT, I-759 ff. As per 31.3.2009 
WRC 2007 has not been ratified by any state or entered into force. 
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aim to ensure a proper level of compensation for damage resulting from oil pollution and ha-
zardous or noxious substances. To this end all these special conventions impose a strict liabi-
lity21 and a compulsory insurance obligation22 on the ship-owner23 and provide for a direct 
right of action of injured parties against the liability underwriters of the ship-owners.24 
3. Beneficiaries of limitation or immunity 
6. The various limitation conventions have in common that besides the ship-owner, also 
(diverging) groups of other persons involved in the operation of the ship, benefit from the 
statutory limitation of liability. In this respect there are two systems in use. Under the gene-
ral limitation conventions, the right to limitation of liability is extended to a wider group of 
persons, whose legal position is equated to that of the ship-owner. In contrast, under the 
specific limitation conventions all liability and the right to limit is channelled towards the 
ship-owner25 and roughly the same group of persons around the ship-owner is granted im-
munity from liability.26 Below, for easy reference these groups of persons either entitled to 
limitation of liability or immune from liability altogether, will be referred to jointly as benefi-
ciaries of limitation or immunity. 
7. Depending on the particular convention the group of beneficiaries of limitation or im-
munity may include one or more of the following parties: – the ship-owner27, – the salvor28, 
– the carrier29, – the operator30, – the charterer31, – the hirer32 or – the manager33 of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
20  Whereas CLC 1992, IFC 1992, Supplementary Fund 2003, CRTD 1989 and HNS 1996 provide for limitation 
funds of their own, Bunker 2001 and WRC 2007 clarify that they do not affect any right to limitation of 
the ship-owner under any applicable national or international regime such as LLMC. See: art. 6 Bunker 
2001, art. 10-2 WRC 2007. 
21  See art. III-1 CLC 1992, art. 7-1 HNS, art. 3-1 Bunker and art. 10-1 WRC. For the rather limited grounds of 
exemption available to the ship-owner, see art. III-2 and III-3 CLC 1992, art. 7-2 and 7-3 HNS, art. 3-2 and 
3-3 Bunker and art. 10-1 (a), (b) and (c) WRC. See also art. 5-4 CRTD. 
22  See art. VII-1 CLC 1992, art. 12 HNS, art. 7-1 Bunker and art. 12-1 WRC. 
23  The only exception is CRTD 1989 which imposes the strict liability and compulsory insurance obligation 
on the carrier, see art. 5-1 and 13-1 CRTD 1989. 
24  See art. VII-8 CLC, art. 12-8 HNS, art. 7-10 Bunker, art. 12-10 WRC and art. 15 CRTD. 
25  An exception is provided by art. 5-1 CRTD in which all liability is channelled, not to owner of the vehicle, 
but to the (contractual) carrier of dangerous goods. 
26  See art. III-4 (a) to (f) CLC 1992, art. 7-5 (a) to (f) HNS, art. 5-7 (a) to (g) CRTD. 
27  See art. 1 1924 Convention, art. 1 1957 Convention, art. 1-1 LLMC, art. 1-1 CLNI, art. 5-7 (c) CRTD, art. V-
1 CLC 1992, art. 9-1 HNS, art. 6 Bunker. 
28  See art. 1-1 LLMC, art. 1-1 CLNI, art. 5-7 (d), (e) and (f) CRTD, art. III-4 (d) and (e) CLC, art. 7-5 (d) and (e) 
HNS, art. 6 Bunker. 
29  See art. 9-1 CRTD. 
30  See art. 10 1924 Convention, art. 6-2 1957 Convention, art. 1-2 LLMC, art. 1-2 CLNI, art. 5-7 (c) CRTD, art. 
III-4 CLC 1992, art. 7-5 (c) HNS, art. 1-3 Bunker. 
31  See art. 10 1924 Convention, art. 6-2 1957 Convention, art. 1-2 LLMC, art. 1-2 CLNI, art. 5-7 (c) CRTD, art. 
III-4 (c) CLC 1992, art. 7-5 (c) HNS, art. 6 Bunker. 
32  See art. 5-7 (c) CRTD. 
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ship, – their respective agents and servants34, – the crew members35 and – the pilot or any 
other person, who without being a crew member, performs services for the ship.36 Further-
more, if the applicable law allows an action in rem against the ship or a direct action against 
the liability underwriters of the ship-owner, then the ship37, respectively the liability under-
writers38 are entitled to invoke limitation of liability as well. 
8. It is a general principle common to the general and special limitation conventions 
that the beneficiaries of limitation or immunity lose this protection if it is proven that the da-
mage “resulted from his personal act or omission, committed with the intent to cause such 
damage, or recklessly and with knowledge that such damage would probably result.”39 Un-
der the older limitation conventions the right to limit of the ship-owner was understood to 
be a limit to his vicarious liability as employer for the acts and faults of his servants, not a 
right to limit for his own faults. Consequently there was no right to limit if “the occurrence 
giving rise to the claim resulted from the actual fault or privity of the owner”.40 This resulted 
in many cases in which the right to limit was successfully contested under the 1957 Conven-
tion.41 The modern approach, which was introduced with CLC 1969 and LLMC 1976, aimed to 
make the limits of liability virtually “unbreakable”.42 It seems that this objective has been 
achieved, because internationally there are hardly any cases where the right to limit is lost43, 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
33  See art. 6-2 1957 Convention, art. 1-2 LLMC, art. 1-2 CLNI, art. 5-7 (c) CRTD, art. III-4 (c) CLC 1992, art. 7-
5 (c) HNS, art. 1-3 Bunker. 
34  See: art. 6-2 1957 Convention, art. 1-4 and 9-2 LLMC, art. 1-3 and 9-3 CLNI, art. 5-7 (a) and (g) CRTD, art. 
III-4 (a) and (f) CLC 1992, art. 7-5 (a) and (f) HNS, art. 6 Bunker. 
35  See art. 6-2 1957 Convention, art. 1-4 LLMC, art. 1-3 CLNI, art. 5-7 (a) CRTD, art. III-4 (a) CLC 1992, art. 7-
5 (a) HNS, art. 6 Bunker. 
36  See art. 1-4 LLMC, art. 1-3 CLNI, art. 5-7 (b) CRTD, art. III-4 (b) CLC 1992, art. 7-5 (b) HNS, art. 6 Bunker. 
37  See art. 1-5 LLMC, art. 1-4 CLNI, art. 6 Bunker. 
38  See art. 1-6 LLMC, art. 1-5 CLNI, art. 15-2 CRTD, art. V-11 and art. VII-8 CLC 1992, art. 9-11 and art. 12-8 
HNS, art. 6 and art. 7-10 Bunker. 
39  See art. 4 LLMC, art. 4 CLNI, art. 10-1 CRTD, art. V-2 CLC and art. 9-2 HNS. 
40  See art. 1-1 and art. 6-3 1957 Convention, and art. 2 1924 Convention. 
41  See e.g. The Lady Gwendolen [1965] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 335, 335 (CA); The Marion [1984] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 1; 
Cour d’appel (CA) Aix-en-Provence 9.6.1988, Droit Maritime Français (DMF), 1989, 708, CA Aix-en-
Provence 14.12.1988, DMF 1990, 248. 
42  See: F. Berlingieri (ed.), The Travaux Préparatoires of the LLMC Convention, 1976 and of the Protocol of 
1996, Antwerp, CMI, 2000, p. 123, No. [8]. 
43  See e.g. the decision of the Court of Appeal (CA) The Hague 26.2.2002 S&S 2002, 60 [The Pioner Onegi] 
setting aside the earlier decision of 23.4.1998 of the Court of Rotterdam in which – subject to further 
evidence – the loss of the right to limit by the ship-owner was considered possible on the alleged facts 
of the case. The Pioner Onegi had left the port of Antwerp in a very unstable condition because of too 
many containers stowed above deck and capsized at the first bend in the river Scheldt on its way to sea. 
It was alleged that an employee at the head-office had pressured the master to take on board too much 
cargo. The CA The Hague decided that even if that was true, it did not constitute a “personal act or 
omission, committed with the intent to cause such damage, or recklessly and with knowledge that such 
damage would probably result” on the part of the ship-owner, as required under art. 4 LLMC to break 
the right to limit. 
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however with the notable exception of France, where despite the new criterion of art. 4 
LLMC it is still fairly easy to “break” the right to limit.44 
4. An intermezzo: Commune de Mesquer v. Total 
9. In the recent case of Commune de Mesquer v. Total France45, the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) was confronted with preliminary questions of which the third essentially raised 
the issue whether the concepts of limitation of liability for the ship-owner in art. V-1 CLC 
1992 and of immunity from liability for the charterer in art. III-4 (c) CLC 1992, are compatible 
with the liability of the “holder” in art. 15 of the Waste Directive 75/442.46 
10. The case arose out of the sinking of the oil tanker “Erika” and the resulting oil spill on 
the Atlantic Coast of France in 1999. Several factors added to the complexity of this case. 
Firstly, Waste Directive 75/442 (as all Directives under European law) is to be implemented 
through the national legislation of the EU member states, in this case France, yet the authen-
tic interpretation of these Directives is reserved for the European Court of Justice. Secondly, 
although CLC 1992 and IFC 1992 are not part of EU law, at the time of the incident CLC 1992 
and IFC 1992 had been ratified by France and 23 other EU member states and are very im-
portant international conventions providing worldwide uniformity on liability for and com-
pensation of oil pollution damage. 
11. Before a conflict could arise between Waste Directive 75/442 and CLC 1992, the ECJ 
had to establish first whether the Erika’s cargo of heavy fuel oil constituted a “waste” under 
Waste Directive 75/442. The ECJ’s approach in answer to the first question is that “heavy 
fuel oil sold as a combustible fuel does not constitute “waste” within the meaning of … (Was-
te Directive 75/442), where it is exploited or marketed on economically advantageous terms 
and is capable of actually being used as a fuel without requiring prior processing.”47 This im-
plies that a cargo of heavy fuel oil carried as cargo on board of an oil tanker as such is not a 
waste under Waste Directive 75/442.  
                                                             
44  See e.g. Trib. Bordeaux 23.9.1993, DMF 1993, 731 and CA Bordeaux 31.5.2005, DMF 2005, 839 [The 
Heidberg] with comment A. Vialard ; P. Bonassies and C. Scapel, Droit Maritime, Paris, LGDJ, 2006, No. 
428 ff., I. Corbier, ‘La faute inexcusable de l’armateur or du droit  de l’armateur de limiter sa responsabi-
lité’, DMF 2002, 403 ff., Ph. Delebecque, ‘La faute inexcusable en droit maritime français (Brèves remar-
ques sur deux aspects controverses) », Jurisprudence du Port d’Anvers (JPA), 2005, p. 328.  See also the 
overview of French case law in : F. Stevens, Beperking van aansprakelijkheid, Zee- en Binnenvaart, Brus-
sels, Larcier, 2008, p. 105 ff. 
45  ECJ 24.6.2008 (C-188/07), [2008] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 672 [Commune de Mesquer v. Total France S.A., Total 
International Ltd.] 
46  European Council Directive 75/442 on Waste, as amended by European Commission Decision 96/350. 
47  ECJ 24.6.2008 (C-188/07), [2008] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 672 [Commune de Mesquer v. Total], No. 90, sub 1. 
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12. However, the position is different where (part of) a cargo of heavy fuel oil (= hydro-
carbons) escapes from the ship and spills into the sea water. In that case, “hydrocarbons ac-
cidentally spilled at sea following a shipwreck, mixed with water and sediment and drifting 
along the coast of a Member State until being washed up on that coast, constitute waste wi-
thin the meaning of … (Waste Directive 75/442), where they are no longer capable of being 
exploited or marketed without prior processing.”48 The implication is that a spill of heavy 
fuel oil from a tanker vessel constitutes both “oil”49 “pollution damage”50 under CLC 1992 
and a “disposal of waste”51 to which Waste Directive 75/442 applies. 
13. The third question before the ECJ was whether “in the event of the sinking of an oil 
tanker, the producer of the heavy fuel oil spilled at sea and/or the seller of the fuel and char-
terer of the ship carrying the fuel may be required to bear the cost of disposing of the waste 
thus generated, even though the substance spilled at sea was transported by a third party, in 
this case a carrier by sea.”52  
14. This raised the issue whether charterer Total International and/or seller Total France 
were to be considered “producer”53 and/or (previous) “holder”54 of the waste under Waste 
Directive 75/442. In the affirmative this would mean that these companies were liable to 
bear the cost of disposing of waste/clean up of the oil spill under the “polluter pays”-princi-
ple of art. 15 Waste Directive 75/442.55 In its decision, the ECJ held that the reason for im-
posing the financial obligation of bearing the cost of disposing of waste upon previous hol-
                                                             
48  ECJ 24.6.2008 (C-188/07), [2008] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 672 [Commune de Mesquer v. Total], No. 90, sub 2. 
49  In art. I-5 CLC “oil” is defined as “any persistent hydrocarbon mineral oil such as crude oil, fuel oil, heavy 
diesel oil and lubricating oil,, whether carried on board a ship as cargo or in the bunkers of such a ship.” 
50  In art. 1-6 CLC “pollution damage” is defined as: “(a) loss or damage caused outside the ship by conta-
mination resulting from the escape or discharge of oil from the ship, wherever such escape or discharge 
may occur, provided that compensation for impairment of the environment other than loss of profit 
from such impairment shall be limited to costs of reasonable measures of reinstatement actually under-
taken or to be undertaken; (b) the costs of preventive measures and further loss or damage caused by 
preventive measures.” 
51  See for definitions of “waste” and “disposal”, art. 1 (a) j° Annex I, resp. art. 1 (e) j° Annex II, A of Waste 
Directive 75/442. 
52  As reformulated by the ECJ in its judgment in No. 64. 
53  “Producer” is defined in art. 1 (b) Waste Directive 75/442 as “anyone whose activities produce waste 
(“original producer”) and/or anyone who carries out pre-processing, mixing or other operations resul-
ting in a change in the nature or composition of this waste”. 
54  “Holder” is defined in art. I (c) Waste Directive 75/442 as “the producer of the waste or the natural or 
legal person who is in possession of it”. 
55  Art. 15 Waste Directive reads as follows: “In accordance with the “polluter pays” principle, the cost of 
disposing of waste must be borne by: – the holder who has waste handled by a waste collector or by an 
undertaking as referred to in Article 9, and/or – the previous holders or the producer of the product 
from which the waste came. 
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ders or the producer of waste is “their contribution to the creation of the waste and, in cer-
tain cases, to the consequent risk of pollution.”56 The ECJ then continues as follows: 
“78. In the case of hydrocarbons accidentally spilled at sea following the sinking of an oil tanker, 
the national court may therefore consider that the seller of the hydrocarbons and charterer of 
the ship carrying them has ‘produced’ waste, if that court, in the light of the elements which it 
alone is in a position to assess, reaches the conclusion that that seller-charterer contributed to 
the risk that the pollution caused by the shipwreck would occur, in particular if he failed to take 
measures to prevent such an incident, such as measures concerning the choice of ship. In such 
circumstances, it will be possible to regard the seller-charterer as a previous holder of the waste 
for the purposes of applying the first part of the second indent of Article 15 of Directive 75/442. 
15. It follows from the ECJ’s reasoning that it is quite possible that a court in a member 
state may conclude that the charterer and by extension also the owner of a ship are to be 
considered “producers” and “(previous) holders” of waste and therefore liable under art. 15 
Waste Directive 75/442 if on the facts of the case it is established that the charterer and/or 
the ship-owner through his/their conduct contributed to the risk of pollution. 
16. This however raises the question in earnest whether the ship-owner’s limitation of 
liability under art. III-1 CLC and the charterer’s immunity of liability under art. III-4 CLC are 
compatible with art. 15 Waste Directive 75/442. The ECJ begins by pointing out57 that art. 15 
Waste Directive does not preclude EU member states from laying down pursuant to their 
obligations under CLC 1992 and IFC 1992 that the liability of the ship-owner and the charte-
rer is limited or that the IOPC Fund assumes liability to a maximum amount “in place of the 
‘holders’ …, for the cost of disposal of the waste resulting from hydrocarbons accidentally 
spilled at sea.” The ECJ then continues as follows: 
“82 However, if it happens that the cost of disposal of the waste produced by an accidental spilla-
ge of hydrocarbons at sea is not borne by that fund, or cannot be borne because the ceiling for 
compensation for that accident has been reached, and that, in accordance with the limitations 
and/or exemptions of liability laid down, the national law of a Member State, including the law 
derived from international agreements, prevents that cost from being borne by the ship-owner 
and/or the charterer, even though they are to be regarded as ‘holders’ within the meaning of Ar-
ticle 1(c) of Directive 75/442, such a national law will then, in order to ensure that Article 15 of 
that directive is correctly transposed, have to make provision for that cost to be borne by the 
producer of the product from which the waste thus spread came. In accordance with the ‘pollu-
ter pays’ principle, however, such a producer cannot be liable to bear that cost unless he has con-
tributed by his conduct to the risk that the pollution caused by the shipwreck will occur. 
17. Although the European Union is not bound by CLC 1992 and IFC 199258, the above ci-
tations nevertheless suggest that the ECJ is lenient towards member states who in their 
national implementation of the Waste Directive, prevent that the costs of waste disposal 
                                                             
56  ECJ 24.6.2008 (C-188/07), [2008] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 672 [Commune de Mesquer v. Total], Nos. 77, 89. 
57  ECJ 24.6.2008 (C-188/07), [2008] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 672 [Commune de Mesquer v. Total], No. 81. 
58  As expressly observed by the European Court of Justice in No. 85 of decision of 24.6.2008 (C-188/07), 
[2008] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 672 [Commune de Mesquer v. Total]. 
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above the applicable CLC and IFC limits are borne by the ship-owner or charterer, who under 
art. 15 Waste Directive may qualify as “holders” of the waste. It suffices for the proper trans-
position of the Waste Directive for the member state to provide that in that case “the produ-
cer of the product from which the waste thus spread came” (i.e. the manufacturer of the 
heavy fuel oil) bears the costs of disposal. 
5. Patchwork of limitation regimes 
18. As a result of the multitude of general and specific limitation conventions currently in 
force, a rather complex patchwork of limitation regimes has developed for the various claims 
arising out of a maritime casualty. In order to create an overview over this inaccessible area 
of the law, it is necessary to begin by distinguishing the claims subject to limitation from all 
other claims which are in principle recoverable in full. After the claims subject to limitation 
have been identified, these claims can be divided over the various claim categories for which 
separate liability limits have been set under the general and special limitation conventions. 
6. Claims subject to limitation 
19. As a general rule, limitation of liability is possible only59 in relation to liability claims in 
respect of loss or damage occurring on board or in direct connection with the operation of 
the ship or with salvage operations.60 The legal basis for the claim whether in contract, tort 
or otherwise, is generally of no consequence61 as long as it is a civil liability. Claims based on 
public law, e.g. a fine based on criminal or administrative law or a tax liability are not subject 
to limitation of liability under the general or special limitation conventions. 
20. Furthermore a claim subject to limitation must either fall within the catalogue of 
claims to which the general conventions apply62 or under the material scope of application 
of one of the special conventions.63 Whether the claim is brought directly by the injured par-
ty itself or indirectly by another party who has compensated this loss and has become subro-
                                                             
59  An exception is CRTD 1989, which in art. 1-6 CRTD uses the notion of “vehicle” to refer to “a road vehic-
le, a railway wagon or a ship”, but the basic idea is the same. 
60  See art. 1-1 1924 Convention, art. 1-1 1957 Convention, art. 2-1 LLMC, art. 2-1 CLNI, art. 1-10 CRTD, art. 
1-6 CLC 1992, art. 1-6 HNS and art. 1-9 Bunker. 
61  See art. 2-1 LLMC “whatever the basis of liability may be”. 
62  Pursuant to art. 2-1 LLMC and art. 2-1 CLNI the following claims are subject to limitation: claims in res-
pect of (a) loss of life or personal injury or loss of or damage to property and consequential loss resulting 
therefrom, (b) loss resulting from delay in the carriage of cargo, passengers or their luggage, (c) other 
loss resulting from infringements of rights other than contractual rights, (d) and (e) wreck and cargo re-
moval, (f) preventive and loss mitigation measures. See also: art. 1-1 1924 Convention and art. 1-1 1957 
Convention. 
63  See art. 1-10 CRTD, art. 1-6 CLC 1992, art. 1-6 HNS and art. 1-9 Bunker. 
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gated in the claim or who seeks recourse or indemnification is irrelevant.64 Finally, it needs 
to be verified whether the particular claim has not been excluded from limitation, whether 
directly by the relevant limitation convention itself65 or indirectly by a reservation made by 
the contracting state upon ratification of the convention.66 
7. Claim categories and limitation funds 
21. Once the claims subject to limitation have been identified the next step is to deter-
mine the applicable limits of liability. This is necessary because modern limitation conven-
tions differentiate the compensation level of claims based on the nature of the damage. This 
is effected by the creation of different limitation funds for different categories of claims. This 
differentiation prevents that e.g. personal injury claims must compete with claims for com-
pensation of property damage in the division of the fund. It also allows higher limits to be set 
for personal injury claims or oil pollution damage as a matter of public policy. 
22. The LLMC PERSONS FUND relates to claims for loss of life and personal injury other than 
claims from passengers.67 Based on a vessel with a gross tonnage68 of e.g. 40,000 m.t., the 
amount of the persons fund is set at SDR69 11,491,000 under LLMC 1976 and SDR 30,400,000 
under LLMC 1996.70 If the persons fund is insufficient to meet the total quantum of verified 
claims made against it, the fund will be divided proportionally over each of the claims. The 
unpaid balance of each of the personal injury claims will then share rateably with the claims 
made against the General Liability Fund discussed below.71 
                                                             
64  See art. 2-2 LLMC, art. 2-2 CLNI. 
65  See art. 2 and 13 1924 Convention, art. 1-4 1957 Convention, art. 3 LLMC, art. XI CLC, art. 4-3 to 4-5, art. 
5-1 to 5-5 HNS, art. 4 Bunker. The excluded claims under art. 3 LLMC relate to (a) salvage rewards, spe-
cial compensation (art. 14 London Salvage Convention) and GA contributions, (b) claims for oil pollution 
damage covered by CLC 1969 and amendments, (c) and (d) nuclear damage, (e) claims against the ship-
owner or salvor from their servants if precluded by the law applicable to the employment contract. See 
also art. 15-5 LLMC excluding air-cushion vehicles and floating oil rigs from the application of LLMC. 
66  Pursuant to art. 15-2 and 15-3 LLMC contracting states may depart from LLMC in relation to ships inten-
ded for inland navigation, ships of less than 300 tons and purely national cases. Furthermore under art. 
18 LLMC, a contracting state may upon ratification reserve the right to exclude claims for wreck and car-
go removal costs (see art. 2-1 (d) and (e) LLMC). Art. 18 LLMC 1996 allows such reservation also for da-
mage claims covered by HNS 1996 and amendments. See also art. 8 1957 Convention, art. 18 CLNI. 
67  See art. 2-1 (a) and art. 6-1 (a) LLMC. 
68  See art. 6-5 LLMC which refers for the calculation of the gross tonnage to the International Convention 
on Tonnage Measurement of Ships, 1969. 
69  The abbreviation “SDR” stands for “Special Drawing Right”, the unit of account of the International Mo-
netary Fund, see also art. 8 LLMC. 
70  See also art. 6-1 CLNI.  
71  See art. 6-2 LLMC. 
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23. The LLMC PASSENGER FUND applies to claims for loss of life and personal injury from 
passengers72 and is based on the passenger carrying capacity of the ship. The amount of the 
fund for a ship authorised to carry 1,000 passengers is SDR 25 million under LLMC 1976 and 
even SDR 175 million under LLMC 1996.73  
24. The LLMC GENERAL LIABILITY FUND applies to all claims subject to limitation other than 
personal injury claims.74 Based on a vessel with a gross tonnage of e.g. 40,000 m.t., the 
amount of the general liability fund is set at SDR 6,343,500 under LLMC 1976 and SDR 15.2 
million under LLMC 1996. In principle all claims rank equally under the general liability fund, 
however LLMC allows contracting states to give priority in their national law to claims in 
relation to harbour works, basins and waterways and navigational aids.75 
25. WRECK AND CARGO REMOVAL CLAIMS. In principle the application of the LLMC General 
Liability Fund extends also to claims for wreck and cargo removal.76 This fact recognized by 
the 2007 Wreck Removal Convention, which in art. 10-2 WRC expressly states that the WRC 
shall not affect any right of the ship-owner to limit liability under any applicable national or 
international regime such as the LLMC. However, art. 18 LLMC allows contracting states to 
reserve the right to exclude claims for wreck and cargo removal from limitation under LLMC. Several 
European states such as Belgium, France, Germany, Japan, The Netherlands and the United Kingdom 
have made this reservation of art. 18 LLMC. In that case it is up to the contracting state to decide for 
itself whether to allow limitation of liability for such claims under a separate wreck and cargo 
removal fund77 or not at all78 
                                                             
72  See art. 7-1 LLMC and art. 7-1 CLNI. Passenger is defined in art. 7-2 LLMC as a person carried in that ship 
(a) under a contract of passenger carriage or (b) who, with the carrier’s consent, accompanies a vehicle 
or live animals covered by a contract for the carriage of goods. 
73  The LLMC passenger limits may conflict with the limit of SDR 400,000 per passengers as contained in art. 
7 the proposed EU Regulation on the liability of carriers of passengers by sea and inland waterways in 
the event of accidents, COM (2005) 592 final and 2005/0241 (COD) if it enters into force.  
74  See art. 6-1 (b) LLMC.  
75  See art. 6-3 LLMC. 
76  See art. 6-1 (b) and art. 2-1 (d) and (e) LLMC. 
77  This option was used by Germany, Belgium and The Netherlands which states allow under § 487 HGB 
(German Commercial Code), art. 18-1 Wrakkenwet (Belgian Wreckages Act), resp. art. 8:755-1 (c) BW 
(Dutch Civil Code) limitation for wreck and cargo removal claims under a separate fund. Based upon a 
vessel with a gross tonnage of 40,000 m.t. the amount of the wreck and cargo removal fund is SDR 15.2 
million (Germany), € 8,767,500 (Belgium), SDR 6,414,500 (Netherlands). 
78  This option has been used by the United Kingdom and France which states do not allow limitation of lia-




26. OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE NOT COVERED BY CLC. In principle the application of the LLMC General 
Liability Fund extends also to claims for oil pollution damage not covered by CLC such as bunker oil 
spills from non-tanker vessels79 
27. The LLMC SALVOR’S FUNDS. The abovementioned LLMC-limits apply in principle also to 
liability claims against a salvor operating from his own ship. However if the salvor operates 
from no ship at all or solely from the ship to be salved, then the applicable limits are based 
on a fictional ship with a gross tonnage of just 1,500 m.t.80 Art. 6-1 Bunkers 2001 clarifies that 
that convention does not affect any right of the ship-owner to limit liability under any applicable 
national or international regime such as LLMC. 
28. The OIL POLLUTION FUNDS. For oil pollution damage caused within the jurisdiction81 of 
contracting States a three tier limitation and compensation system has developed. CLC 1992 
applies to the first tier, IFC 1992 to the second tier and the Supplementary Fund Protocol 
2003 to the third tier of compensation. Whereas the CLC Fund is paid for by the ship-owner, 
the IFC Fund and the Supplementary Fund are paid for by the oil industry on the basis of con-
tributions levied by the IOPC Fund.82  
– The CLC FUND. The first tier of compensation is to be provided by the ship-owner who 
can limit his liability by creating a limitation fund based on the gross tonnage of the 
ship, which cannot exceed SDR 89.7 million.83 
– THE IFC FUND. In cases where a claimant has been unable to obtain compensation of oil 
pollution damage because the ship-owner is not liable under CLC for the oil pollution 
damage, or because the ship-owner is financially incapable to meet his obligations or 
because the total damage amount of all claimants exceeds the level of compensation 
                                                             
79  Claims for oil pollution damage resulting from a bunker oil spill from a non-tanker sea-going vessel are 
subject to limitation under art. 2-1 (a) or (c) LLMC and are not excluded in art. 3 (b) LLMC which excludes 
only claims for oil pollution damage covered by CLC are excluded from the scope of application of the 
LLMC. As follows from art. I-5 CLC 1992 only oil pollution damage as a result of bunker fuel escaping 
from tanker vessels is covered by CLC and not bunker fuel escaping from other vessels. 
80  See art. 6-4 LLMC. As a result the persons fund is then set at SDR 833,000 (LLMC 1976) and SDR 2 million 
(LLMC 1996) whereas the salvor’s general liability fund amounts to SDR 595,000 (LLMC 1976) and SDR 1 
million (LLMC 1996). 
81  Under art. II CLC 1992, this convention applies to pollution damage caused (a) in the territory, including 
the territorial sea or (b) in the exclusive economic zone of a contracting state, and further to preventive 
measures wherever taken to prevent such damage. 
82  See art. 10-1 IFC 1992and art. 10-1 Supplementary Fund Protocol 2003 which impose a duty to contri-
bute to the IFC and Supplementary funds on any person who within a calendar year has received over 
150,000 m.t. of oil in ports or terminal installations on the territory of a contracting state. 
83  See art. V-1 CLC 1992 as amended by the Legal Committee of the United Nations International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) in its first resolution dated 18 October 2000. Based on a ship with a gross tonnage of 
40,000 m.t., the applicable limit is SDR 26,595,000. 
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provided by the first tier84, the International Oil Pollution Convention (IOPC) Fund will85 
pay compensation up to an overall level of SDR 203 million.86 
– The SUPPLEMENTARY FUND. In cases where a claimant has been unable to obtain full and 
adequate compensation of oil pollution damage because the total amount of this da-
mage exceeds the applicable limits under the CLC and IFC Funds, then the Supplemen-
tary Fund will provide additional compensation. However this additional compensation 
is limited so that the total sum payable in respect of any one incident under CLC, IFC 
and Supplementary Fund may not exceed SDR 750 million.87 
29. The HNS FUNDS. Although HNS 1996 may well be superseded by a Protocol to amend 
it before ever entering into force88, a brief look at the HNS-regime is included in this over-
view of the various limitation regimes in relation to different kinds of claims. HNS provides a 
two tier compensation and limitation system for damage89 caused by hazardous and noxious 
substances (hereafter HND damage)90 within the jurisdiction91 of contracting States. The first 
tier of compensation for HNS damage is to be provided by the ship-owner who can limit his 
liability by creating a limitation fund based on the gross tonnage of the ship, which cannot 
exceed SDR 100 million.92 In cases where a claimant has been unable to obtain compensa-
tion of HNS damage because of the fact that the ship-owner is not liable, or because the 
ship-owner is financially incapable to meet his obligations or because the total damage 
amount of all claimants exceeds the level of compensation provided by the first tier93, the 
                                                             
84  See art. 4-1 IFC 1992 
85  The only exceptions to the obligation of the IOPC Fund to compensate oil pollution damage covered by 
the CLC 1992 and IFC 1992 are given in art. 4-2 and 4-3 IFC 1992. 
86  See art. 4-4 (a) and (b) IFC 1992 as amended by the Legal Committee of IMO in its second resolution of 
18 October 2000. 
87  See art. 4-2 Supplementary Fund Protocol to IFC 1992. 
88  At the 95th session of the IMO Legal Committee early April 2009 a draft proposal to amend HNS 1996 
was adopted. If in June 2009 the IMO Council approves, a diplomatic conference could be convened to 
consider the protocol in 2010. 
89  In art. 1-6 HNS “damage” is defined as (a) loss of life and personal injury, (b) loss of or damage to pro-
perty, (c) loss or damage by contamination of the environment (but limited to costs of reasonable mea-
sures of reinstatement actually undertaken or to be undertaken) and (d) costs of preventive measures 
or further loss or damage caused by preventive measures. Pursuant to art. 11 HNS claims for death and 
personal injury have priority over other claims. 
90  See art. 1-6 and 1-5 HNS. 
91  Under art. 3 HNS, this convention applies to damage caused by hazardous and noxious substances (a) in 
the territory, including the territorial sea of a contracting state or (b) in the exclusive economic zone of a 
contracting state, (c) carried on board of a ship registered in or flying the flag of a contracting state and 
(d) to preventive measures wherever taken, to prevent or minimize such damage. 
92  See art. 9-1 HNS. Based on a ship of 40,000 m.t., the applicable limit would be SDR 67 million. 
93  See art. 14-1 and 14-2 HNS. 
14 
 
Hazardous and Noxious Substances (HNS) Fund in London will pay94 compensation of oil pol-
lution damage up to an overall level of SDR 250 million (second tier).95 
30. The CRTD Fund. Although CRTD 1989 has not been ratified by any state and may ne-
ver enter into force, a brief look at the CRTD-regime will complete this overview of the va-
rious limitation regimes in relation to different kinds of claims. CRTD applies to claims for da-
mage96 caused within the jurisdiction97 of contracting States during carriage of dangerous 
goods by road, rail or inland navigation vessel, other than claims arising out of any contract 
for the carriage of goods and persons.98 A carrier may limit his liability for CRTD damage by 
constituting the relevant limitation fund(s) for the relevant claim(s). CRTD differentiates the 
applicable limits of liability in two ways. Firstly, the CRTD limits for a carrier by road or rail 
are substantially higher than those for a carrier by inland navigation vessel.99 Secondly, the 
limits for loss of life and personal injury claims are substantially higher than those applicable 
to any other claim.100 
8. Procedural complications 
31. Whenever the ship-owner or any other beneficiary of limitation seeks to invoke his 
right to limitation of liability against claims from his creditors, this is likely to give rise to ma-
ny complications of a procedural nature. To the extent that procedural matters are not regu-
lated in the uniform limitation conventions, it is a general principle that procedural matters 
are to be decided by the law of the courts seized of the case (the lex fori).101 
 
32. One reason for the abovementioned procedural complications is that limitation of lia-
bility may be a key issue in at least three kinds of proceedings taking place simultaneously or 
in succession of each other. Firstly, court or arbitral proceedings to the merits of the claim 
                                                             
94  The only exceptions to the obligation of the HNS Fund to compensate HNS damage are given in art. 14-3 
and 14-4 HNS 1996. 
95  See art. 14-5 HNS 1996. 
96  In art. 1-10 CRTD “damage” is defined as (a) loss of life and personal injury on board or outside the ve-
hicle carrying the dangerous goods, (b) loss of or damage to property outside the vehicle carrying the 
dangerous goods, (c) loss or damage by contamination of the environment (but limited to costs of rea-
sonable measures of reinstatement actually undertaken or to be undertaken) and (d) costs of preventive 
measures or further loss or damage caused by preventive measures. 
97  Under art. 2 CRTD, this convention applies (a) to damage sustained in the territory of a contracting state 
or (b) to preventive measures wherever taken, to prevent or minimize such damage. 
98  See art. 3 and 4 CRTD. 
99  SDR 18 million and SDR 12 million for the carrier by road or rail (see art. 9-1 CRTD) compared to SDR 8 
million and SDR 7 million for the carrier by inland navigation vessel (see art. 9-2 CRTD). 
100  SDR 18 million and SDR 8 million in respect of claims for loss of life and personal injury (see art. 9-1 (a) 
and art. 9-2 (a) CRTD) as compared to SDR 12 million and SDR 7 million in respect of any other claim (see 
art. 9-1 (b) and art. 9-2 (b) CRTD. 
101  See art. 8-5 1924 Convention, art. 4 1957 Convention, art. 14 LLMC, art. 14 CLNI. 
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(main proceedings) are often inevitable if liability is not admitted or the claim amount in dis-
pute. Secondly, court proceedings with regard to the constitution and division of the limita-
tion fund (limitation proceedings) are often needed and thirdly, summary relief proceedings 
before a court where conservatory and enforcement measures against the ship or other as-
sets were taken, in order to obtain security for a claim subject to limitation (provisional pro-
ceedings). Normally, ship’s arrests are lifted voluntarily after alternative security was provi-
ded by the P&I Club of the ship, but even then an issue may still arise about the return of the 
guarantees after the constitution of the limitation fund. 
 
33. Although in principle these three kinds of proceedings take place independently from 
each-other, as will be shown below there is a need for co-ordination between them if the 
objectives of limitation of liability are not to be defeated. Furthermore issues may arise with 
regard to jurisdiction in relation to the main proceedings and the limitation proceedings and 
generally with regard to the enforcement and recognition of judgments.  
9. Jurisdiction 
34. There is no unity of approach between the general and special limitation conventions 
in relation to jurisdiction with regard to the main proceedings or the limitation proceedings. 
The general limitation conventions such as LLMC leave the issue of jurisdiction unregulated 
and leave it therefore to the domestic jurisdiction rules of the court seized102 to determine 
whether it will accept or decline jurisdiction with regard to the proceedings to the merits of 
a claim or to limitation proceedings.103 Although art. 11-1 LLMC provides that “any person 
alleged to be liable may constitute a fund with a Court or other authority in any State Party 
in which legal proceedings are instituted in respect of claims subject to limitation”, this pro-
vision does not provide a ground for jurisdiction but rather presumes such jurisdiction to be 
there.104 Therefore, as observed by the English Court of Appeal in The Western Regent105 (as 
per LJ Clarke): 
                                                             
102  Under the Brussels- I Regulation 44/2001 art. 7 provides a jurisdiction ground for limitation proceedings: 
“Where by virtue of this Regulation a court of a Member State has jurisdiction in actions relating to liabi-
lity from the use or operation of a ship, that court, or any other court substituted for this purpose by the 
internal law of that Member State, shall also have jurisdiction over claims for limitation of such liability.” 
See also art. 6-bis Lugano Convention 1988. 
103  Cf. N. Meeson, Admiralty Jurisdiction and Practice, 2nd ed. London, LLP, 2000, No. 8-074, D.C. Jackson, 
Enforcement of Maritime Claims, 3rd Ed., London, LLP, 2000, No. 24.39, P. Wetterstein, ‘Article 7 of the 
Brussels I – regulation and limitation of liability’, (2005) 11 Journal of International Maritime Law (JIML) 
417 e.v., W. van der Velde, De positie van het zeeschip in het internationaal privaatrecht (The position of 
the ship in private international law), diss. Groningen, Deventer, Kluwer, 2006, p. 403 e.v. 
104  This is even more clear under art. 11-1 CLNI which reads as follows: “any person alleged to be liable may 
constitute a fund with a Court or other authority in any State Party in which legal proceedings are insti-
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“15. There is no general jurisdiction provision in the Convention stating where the right of limita-
tion must be invoked. It therefore appears to me that in principle the Convention permits a party 
to seek to limit its liability in any Contracting State which has personal jurisdiction over the defen-
dant. (…)” 
35. On the other hand, the special limitation conventions do provide jurisdiction grounds, 
both for the main proceedings to the merits of the claim and for the limitation proceedings. 
Under the exclusive jurisdiction grounds of CLC 1992, HNS and Bunker actions for compensa-
tion of the relevant kind of damage, may only be brought before the courts of the contrac-
ting state on whose territory this damage has occurred.106 See e.g. art. IX-1 CLC 1992107, 
which reads as follows: 
“-1. Where an incident has caused pollution damage in the territory, including the territorial sea 
or an area referred to in Article II, of one or more Contracting States or preventive measures have 
been taken to prevent or minimize pollution damage in such territory including the territorial sea 
or area, actions for compensation may only be brought in the Courts of any such Contracting 
State or States. Reasonable notice of any such action shall be given to the defendant.” 
36. In addition, art. 38-2 HNS provides several alternative jurisdiction grounds for HNS 
damage which occurs on the High Seas, outside the territory of any state:  
“-2. Where an incident has caused damage exclusively outside the territory, including the territo-
rial sea, of any State and either the conditions for application of this Convention set out in Article 
3(c) have been fulfilled or preventive measures to prevent or minimize such damage have been 
taken, actions for compensation may be brought against the owner or other person providing fi-
nancial security for the owner's liability only in the courts of: 
(a) the State Party where the ship is registered or, in the case of an unregistered ship, the State 
Party whose flag the ship is entitled to fly; or 
(b) the State Party where the owner has habitual residence or where the principal place of busi-
ness of the owner is established; or 
(c) the State Party where a fund has been constituted in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 3. 
 3. Reasonable notice of any action taken under paragraph 1 or 2 shall be given to the defendant. 
(…)” 
37. CLC 1992 and HNS further provide that the ship-owner may constitute a limitation 
fund with the court or other competent authority of any one of the contracting states in 
which an action for compensation of damages was brought.108 If no action is brought, art. 9-
                                                                                                                                                                                              
tuted in respect of claims subject to limitation, or if no legal proceedings are instituted, with the Compe-
tent or other competent authority in any State party in which proceedings may be instituted for a claim 
subject to limitation.” (with added stress). 
105  Seismic Shipping Inc./Total E & P UK Ltd., The Western Regent, [2005] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 359 (CA). Cf. The 
Denise, [2005] 2 All E R 47 (Admiralty Court). 
106  See art. 9-1 CLC, art. 38-1 and -2 HNS and art. 9-1 Bunker. See also art. 19 CRTD. 
107  Which is identical in wording to art. 9-1 and 9-2 Bunker combined. Art. 34-1 HNS reads as follows: “Juris-
diction in respect of an action against the Owner -1. Where an incident has caused damage in the terri-
tory, including the territorial sea or in an area referred to in Article 3(b), of one or more States Parties, 
or preventive measures have been taken to prevent or minimize damage in such territory including the 
territorial sea or in such area, actions for compensation may be brought against the owner or other 
person providing financial security for the owner's liability only in the courts of any such States Parties. 
108  See art. V-3 CLC 1992 and art. 9-3 HNS.  
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3 HNS even allows the limitation fund to be constituted in anyone country where an action 
under art. 38 HNS can be brought. 
10. Optional nature of right to invoke limitation of liability 
38. Limitation of liability is an optional right of the ship-owner, not an obligation. In prin-
ciple this option can be invoked until payment of the claim has been effected whether volun-
tarily or through the enforcement of a judgment condemning the debtor to pay the claim. 
This latter point was illustrated by the recent Uno-case109, in which the Danish ship-owner 
chose to wait until the moment that enforcement in Denmark was asked pursuant to the 
Brussels I Regulation 44/2001110 of a German court judgment, to constitute a limitation fund 
in Denmark. 
The case concerned a collision in the Kiel Channel, Germany between the Danish m.s. “Uno” and 
the German barge “Dettmer Tank 46/116”. As a result of the collision, the “Uno” sinks and its 
wreck is removed by the Wasser- und Schiffahrtsdirektion Nord (WSN) a branch of the German 
government. WSN sues owners of “Uno” before the local court in Itzehoe and obtains a judgment 
condemning owners of the “Uno” to pay full compensation of the wreck removal costs. Owners 
of the “Uno” chose not to invoke limitation of liability for the wreck removal costs before the 
German Court, because under German law111 a separate wreck removal fund equal to the gene-
ral liability fund under LLMC would have been necessary, whereas under Danish law the LLMC ge-
neral liability fund would also extend to wreck removal claims. Instead they waited until the WSN 
asked for the enforcement of the court judgment in Denmark to invoke limitation, because Den-
mark had not made the reservation of art. 18 LLMC in order to exclude wreck and cargo removal 
claims from the application of LLMC. 
39. Not only is limitation of liability an optional right, under art. 10-1 LLMC it may even 
be invoked without the constitution of a limitation fund. Unfortunately there is no unity of 
approach between the general and special limitation conventions with regard to the ques-
tion whether the constitution of a limitation fund is a condition precedent to the right to in-
voke limitation of liability. Art. 10-1 LLMC112 states quite categorically that “limitation may 
be invoked notwithstanding that a limitation fund as mentioned in Article 11 has not been 
constituted”, whereas art. V-3 CLC 1992 and art. 9-1 HNS provide that the ship-owner who 
wishes to avail himself of the benefit of limitation must constitute a fund. In the same vein, 
the second sentence of art. 10-1 LLMC permits a contracting state to provide in its national 
                                                             
109  An unofficial English translation of the decision dated 11.5.2005 of the Maritime and Commercial Court 
of Copenhagen in the Uno-case is attached to this contribution. With special thanks to Mr. Axel Laudrup 
of the Copenhagen law firm Gorissen, Federspiel, Kierkegaard.  
110  European Council regulation 44/2001 of 22 .12.2000 on jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in 
civil and commercial matters. 
111  § 487 HGB, see above footnote 76. 
112  Cf. art. 10-1 CLNI. 
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law that a beneficiary of limitation may only invoke the right to limit liability if a limitation 
fund has been constituted.113 
 
40. From LLMC’s Travaux Préparatoires114 it may be deduced that the LLMC-drafters 
were unable to reach consensus on this issue. Some delegations did not wish to allow the 
person liable the option of establishing a fund or not. Other delegations contested the utility 
or desirability of making the constitution of the fund a prerequisite of limitation. A limitation 
fund was considered to be costly, often unnecessary and of no advantage to the claimant if 
he had alternative security already. Also it was said that a mandatory provision would re-
quire provisions on enforcement of judgments and possibly compulsory insurance as well. 
 
41. Admittedly, there may be some situations in maritime practice where the constitu-
tion of a fund is not really necessary to allow limitation of liability to work well, e.g. where 
there is only one creditor, where the right to limitation is accepted or where an amicable 
settlement of the claims based on the limits of liability is possible. However, that is still insuf-
ficient reason to adopt as the main rule under art. 10-1 LLMC that limitation of liability may 
be invoked even without the prior constitution of a fund. 
 
42. Not only does the system in which the constitution of the fund is optional favour the 
debtor too much over his creditors, it also leaves room for uncertainty, which is likely to re-
sult in more court action being taken in order to be the first to seize the court. In addition it 
is in my view undesirable that one or more other courts or arbitral tribunals than the court 
where the limitation fund is situated should decide about fundamental issues such as who 
can limit and whether there is a right to limit at all. What if in the Uno-case, the WSN had as-
ked and obtained a declaratory decision from the local court of Itzehoe, Germany that – fai-
ling the constitution of a limitation fund – the Danish ship-owner was not entitled to limita-
tion of his liability. 
 
43. Furthermore, limitation proceedings to set up and divide the limitation fund offer a 
useful procedural structure which may be used as well for the exchange of information be-
tween all the parties involved and for the co-ordination of various main proceedings to the 
                                                             
113  As follows from the answers received to the CMI-Questionnaire, this option has been used by Germany, 
Mexico, The Netherlands, Slovenia and Venezuela, whereas Australia, Belgium, Chile, Denmark, France, 
Greece, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden a fund allow limitation of liability to be invoked even 
if no limitation fund has been constituted yet, see: F. Berlingieri and G. Timagenis, ‘Analysis of the Res-
ponses to the Questionnaire’, CMI Yearbook 2005-2006, p. 304-305.  
114  See F. Berlingieri (ed.), Travaux Préparatoires of the LLMC Convention, 1976, and of the Protocol of 1996, 
Antwerp, CMI, 2000, p. 280, Nos. [12] 46 and 47. 
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merits sometimes in several jurisdictions, although apart from recginition and enforcement 
rules in the special limitation conventions, no rules governing the relation between the limi-
tation proceedings and the various main proceedings exist. 
 
44. In my view the rule under CLC 1992 and HNS that the constitution of a fund is a pre-
requisite before the right to limit may be invoked deserves to be a general rule applicable to 
all limitation conventions. If that were to imply that rules about the recognition and enforce-
ment of judgments and compulsory insurance needed to be included into LLMC and CLNI, so 
much the better for it. 
11. Limitation proceedings 
45. Although it is possible in limitation cases that there is only one creditor and one deb-
tor, it is more common that there are claims from several parties or even from a multitude 
of parties arising out of the maritime casualty. Under the special conventions, these claims 
must all be directed against the ship-owner115, whereas under the general limitation conven-
tions, it may well be that the claim is directed (also) against e.g. the ship’s managers116, a 
charterer117 or even a crew member.118 
 
46. Either way it is a general principle of limitation law that the limitation amount applies 
to the “aggregate of all claims which arise on any distinct occasion”119, that once a limitation 
fund is constituted creditors must direct their claims against the fund and are barred from 
                                                             
115  See above § 3, no. 6. 
116  Who as managers to owners may have made fatal decisions in relation to the technical maintenance and 
safety management or crewing of the ship. 
117  If a ship operating under a bareboat or demise charter is involved in a collision, it will be the bareboat 
charterer rather than the ship-owner against whom liability claims in collision must be directed under 
English law. This follows from the fact that under the bareboat charter the possession of the ship passes 
to the charterer, as the master of the ship and crew are the servants of the charterer not the owner. 
Furthermore, it may be that the ship-owner seeks recourse against the charterer e.g. for a cargo claim 
brought against him by third parties. Pursuant to art. 2-2 LLMC such recourse or indemnity claims are 
subject to limitation, see: The CMA Djakarta [2004] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 460 (CA). 
118  In some countries such as France and Belgium it is customary in cargo claims to include the master of 
the ship in the list of defendants in court proceedings to the merits. In that case the master whose right 
to limit follows from art. 1-4 LLMC, has an interest in the limitation proceedings as well. 
119  Art. 9-1 LLMC. See also: art. 6 1924 Convention, art. 2 1957 Convention, art. 9-1 CLNI, art. V-1 CLC 1992, 
art. 9-1 HNS, art. 9-1 CRTD. Under the modern general limitation conventions, a limitation fund constitu-
ted by one of the beneficiaries of limitation is to be deemed constituted by all beneficiaries. See art. 11-
3 LLMC and 11-3 CLNI. 
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exercising any rights against other assets of beneficiaries of limitation120 and that the fund is 
to be divided proportionally over the established claims against it.121 
 
47. It follows that a situation may easily arise where claims from various creditors com-
pete with each other for their or a higher share in the limitation fund. The situation is similar 
to other court proceedings where a fund whether in money122 or in assets123, is to be divided 
over various interested parties or creditors and it seems that many legal systems have mo-
delled their limitation proceedings more or less on their insolvency proceedings or their fund 
division proceedings.124 
 
48. This implies that apart from court proceedings for the constitution and division of a 
limitation fund also a mechanism for the verification and assessment of claims made against 
the fund is required not only between creditor and debtor but also between a creditor and 
his fellow creditors. Normally liability claims will be evaluated in court or arbitral procee-
dings to the merits between the creditor(s) and debtor(s) of the claim, however once a limi-
tation fund has been constituted the verification and assessment of a claim will affect the 
interests of fellow creditors against the fund as well. 
 
49. Actually, in cases where liability is not disputed by the debtor and where the total 
quantum of the claims far exceeds the amount of the limitation fund, it will generally be of 
little interest to the ship-owner and his P&I Club or to other beneficiaries of limitation how 
the fund is divided over the claims made against it. However for a creditor against the fund it 
can make quite a difference for the proportion of his claims that is recoverable from the 
fund, how the claims of fellow creditors against the fund are verified and assessed.  
 
                                                             
120  See: art. 5 1957 Convention, art. 13-1 LLMC, art. 13-1 CLNI, art. VI-1 CLC 1992, art. 10-1 HNS, art. 11-8 
CRTD. See also: art. 8 and 9 1924 Convention. 
121  See art. 12-1 LLMC. See also art. 12-1 CLNI, art. V-4 CLC, art. 9-4 HNS, art. 3-2 1957 Convention and art. 
11-4 CRTD. A few exceptions are made to the general principle of proportional division of the limitation 
fund over the established claims, see art 11 HNS and art. 9-3 CRTD which allow claims for death and per-
sonal injury to take priority over other claims. See also art. 6-3 LLMC which allows states to give priority 
in their national law to claims in respect of damage to harbour works, basins and waterways and aids to 
navigation. 
122  E.g. the sale proceeds of the forced sale. 
123  E.g. an insolvent’s estate. 
124  For an overview of how various maritime countries have structured their procedural law, see F. Berlin-
gieri and G. Timagenis, ‘Analysis of the Responses to the Questionnaire”, CMI Yearbook 2005-2006, p. 
304 ff. and F. Berlingieri and G. Timagenis, ‘Digest of the Responses received from Argentina, Australia, 
Belgium, Chile, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Mexico, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Slovenia, Sweden, Venezuela’, CMI Yearbook 2005-2006, p. 313 ff. 
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50. It may even be doubted whether limitation of liability proceedings without such a 
mechanism for fellow creditors to challenge competing claims against the fund constitute a 
“fair trial” in the meaning of article 6 EHRC.125 After all, if they were to allow a creditor’s 
right of claim against the fund126 to be compromised by competing claims from fellow cre-
ditors, without allowing the creditor the fundamental right to challenge these other claims, 
this effectively comes down to the creditor being denied his fundamental right of access to 
justice. 
 
51. If the above reasoning is correct, it may pose a problem under the special rules on in-
ternational recognition and enforcement of judgments under CLC127, HNS128, CRTD129 and 
Bunkers.130 See e.g. art X CLC 1992 which reads as follows:  
“1. Any judgment given by a Court with jurisdiction in accordance with Article IX which is enforce-
able in the State of origin where it is no longer subject to ordinary forms of review, shall be re-
cognized in any Contracting State, except: (a) where the judgment was obtained by fraud; or (b) 
where the defendant was not given reasonable notice and a fair opportunity to present his case. 
2. A judgment recognized under paragraph 1 of this Article shall be enforceable in each Contrac-
ting State as soon as the formalities required in that State have been complied with. The formali-
ties shall not permit the merits of the case to be re-opened.” 
52. These special rules aim to facilitate the free movement of judgments between Con-
tracting States to CLC, HNS and Bunker and complement the exclusive grounds of jurisdiction 
contained therein.131, Only the courts of the state on whose territory the relevant damage 
has occurred, have jurisdiction in relation to claims for compensation of that damage. It is 
therefore not surprising that the special rules on recognition and enforcement under CLC, 
HNS and Bunker have only few refusal grounds and do not permit the merits of the case to 
be reopened. Although between the parties to the proceedings which resulted in the deci-
sion, this rule may be justifiable based upon the principles of res judicata and ne bis in idem, 
                                                             
125  European Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Rome 4.11.1950. 
As far as relevant here art. 6-1 ECRH reads as follows: “Art. 6 Right to a fair trial 1 In the determination 
of his civil rights and obligations …, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable 
time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. … 
126  Which is covered by the rather wide notion of “property” as protected by article 1 of the First Protocol 
to the European Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Rome 20. 
3.1952. Art. 1 First Protocol reads as follows: “Protection of property Every natural or legal person is en-
titled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except 
in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of 
international law. (…)”. 
127  See art. X CLC 1992.  
128  See art. 40 HNS. 
129  See art. 20 CRTD. 
130  See art. 10 Bunker, of which the wording is virtually identical to that of art. X CLC 1992.  




there is no reason why a fellow creditor against the limitation fund who was nor party to 
those proceedings should be bound to that decision and be unable to challenge it.  
12. Recognition of limitation fund 
53. Finally, it is yet another general principle of limitation law that once a limitation fund 
has been constituted, all creditors with claims subject to limitation, must refrain from secu-
ring or enforcing these claims through attachment of any other assets of the beneficiaries of 
limitation (arrest immunity). Instead these claims must be enforced against the limitation 
fund.132 
 
54. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of this principle of arrest immunity under the limita-
tion conventions has always remained somewhat limited because only courts in contracting 
states to the relevant convention were bound by it. Furthermore, particularly in art. 13-2 
LLMC, the way that the rules on arrest immunity, lifting of arrests and return of security al-
ready given were formulated, was insufficiently imperative and left far too much discretio-
nary powers to the courts asked to give effect to them. In contrast, the rule in art. VI CLC 
1992 and art. 10 HNS is of a much better drafting quality because of its imperative nature. 
Art. 13 LLMC and art. VI CLC 1992 read as follows: 
Article 13 Bar to other actions 
1. Where a limitation fund has been constituted in accordance with Article 11, any person having 
made a claim against the fund shall be barred from exercising any right in respect of such claim 
against any other assets of a person by or on behalf of whom the fund has been constituted.  
2. After a limitation fund has been constituted in accordance with Article 11, any ship or other 
property, belonging to a person on behalf of whom the fund has been constituted, which has 
been arrested or attached within the jurisdiction of a State Party for a claim which may be raised 
against the fund, or any security given, may be released by order of the Court or other competent 
authority of such State. However, such release shall always be ordered if the limitation fund has 
been constituted:  
(a) at the port where the occurrence took place, or, if it took place out of port, at the first port of 
call thereafter; or  
(b) at the port of disembarkation in respect of claims for loss of life or personal injury; or  
(c) at the port of discharge in respect of damage to cargo; or  
(d) in the State where the arrest is made.  
3. The rules of paragraphs 1 and 2 shall apply only if the claimant may bring a claim against the li-
mitation fund before the Court administering that fund and the fund is actually available and 
freely transferable in respect of that claim. 
Article VI CLC 1992 
1. Where the owner, after an incident, has constituted a fund in accordance with Article V, and is 
entitled to limit his liability, 
                                                             
132  See art. 8 1924 Convention, art. 5 1957 Convention, art. 13-1 LLMC, art. 13-1  CLNI, art. VI CLC 1992, art. 
10 HNS, art. 11-8 CRTD. 
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(a) no person having a claim for pollution damage arising out of that incident shall be entitled to 
exercise any right against any other assets of the owner in respect of such claim; 
(b) the Court or other competent authority of any Contracting State shall order the release of any 
ship or other property belonging to the owner which has been arrested in respect of a claim for 
pollution damage arising out of that incident, and shall similarly release any bail or other security 
furnished to avoid such arrest.  
2. The foregoing shall, however, only apply if the claimant has access to the Court administering 
the fund and the fund is actually available in respect of his claim. 
55. In recent years however, important developments have taken place in European case 
law, which make clear that the Brussels I Regulation 44/2001 and the Lugano Convention 
1988133 can be made useful to give greater effect and wider recognition to limitation funds 
constituted with courts in Europe. It started with the Maersk Olie & Gas-decision of the Eu-
ropean Court of Justice134, in which it was decided that an ex parte decision of the Groningen 
Court to order the constitution of a limitation fund under the 1957 Convention, was a judg-
ment in the sense of article 25 European Judgments and Jurisdiction Convention (EJJC), 
which had to be recognized pursuant to art. 26 EJJC by the Danish Courts even though at the 
time of the accident, Denmark had already denounced the 1957 Convention in favour of 
LLMC.135 
 
56. Then came the Seawheel Rhine/Assi Eurolink-decision136 of the Dutch Supreme Court. 
In this case a general liability fund of SDR 1.8 Million had already been set up with the Court 
of Stockholm in Sweden when the Seawheel Rhine was arrested twice in Rotterdam in rela-
tion to the collision claim from the owner of the “Assi Eurolink” and a claim for wreck remo-
val costs from the Dutch State. At the time of the incident both Sweden and The Netherlands 
were party to LLMC 1976. However, under Dutch law an additional wreck removal fund of 
about SDR 4.4 Million would have been required in order to limit liability137, whereas under 
                                                             
133  Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, Lugano 
16.9.1988. 
134  ECJ 14.10.2004 (C-39/02), [2005] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 210 [Maersk Olie & Gas v. Firma M. de Haan and W. de 
Boer; The Cornelis Simon]. See also my commentary to this decision, ‘Recognition of foreign limitation 
proceedings under the European Judgments and jurisdiction Convention’, IPRax, 2006, p. 229-233. 
135  Very recently a decision of the Norwegian Supreme Court in the matter of The General Grot-Rowecki 
was reported at www.internationallawoffice.com by G.K. Gjelsten, ‘Landmark Limitation Fund Ruling by 
Supreme Court’, which concerned the recognition under the Lugano Convention 1988 by the Norwegian 
Courts of a French limitation fund under LLMC 1976, although at the time of the incident Norway had 
already ratified LLMC 1996. The Norwegian Supreme Court followed the ECJ’s reasoning in the Maersk 
Olie & Gas-case and gave effect to the French limitation fund. 
136  Hoge Raad 29.9.2006, Schip & Schade 2007, 1 [Seawheel Rhine/Assi Eurolink]. An unofficial translation 
in English of this decision, courtesy of the Rotterdam law firm Van Traa Advocaten is attached as an ap-
pendix to this contribution. 
137  As was mentioned earlier already in footnotes 67 and 76, The Netherlands has used the option in art. 18 




Swedish law the general liability fund applied to both the collision claim and the wreck re-
moval claim. 
 
57. The two ship’s arrests were lifted in return for guarantees and then owners and 
bareboat charterers of the “Seawheel Rhine” commenced summary relief proceedings to ob-
tain the return of the guarantees either under art. 13 LLMC or alternatively pursuant to the 
Brussels I Regulation 44/2001. Both the Court of Rotterdam and The Hague Court of Appeal 
rejected the claim on the ground that in their view LLMC prevailed over the Brussels I Regu-
lation 44/2001 and that the Swedish court need not be recognised under art. 13 LLMC be-
cause it had not been constituted in accordance with art. 11 LLMC because of alleged forum 
shopping by the Swedish owners/bareboat charterers. The matter is then brought before the 
Hoge Raad, the Dutch Supreme Court. 
 
58. In translation138, the Hoge Raad reasons as follows: 
3.4.2 Where the LLMC does not itself include any arrangement in this respect, the recognition 
and enforcement in this country of the decision of the Swedish fund court regarding the limita-
tion petition is governed by the provisions of the Brussels I Regulation. 
3.4.3 The aforementioned decision of the Swedish court to constitute the limitation fund is a 
decision as referred to in Art. 32 of the Brussels I Regulation. The fact that the decision was made 
ex parte does not detract from this (cf. – subject to the Brussels Convention – ECJ 14 October 
2004, case C-39/02 (Maersk/De Haan) (…). 
As ensues from the aforementioned judgment of the European Court of Justice, recognition of a 
decision to constitute a fund to limit liability without prior notice to the relevant creditor, even if 
this creditor has filed an appeal contesting the competence of the court which makes the deci-
sion, cannot be refused in this country on the basis of Art. 34, point 2 of the Brussels I Regulation, 
provided this decision was served on or notified to the defendant in a regular and timely manner. 
The latter is the case in these proceedings, now that … it has been established that Westereems 
filed an appeal against this decision before the SVEA Court in Stockholm, which assumes such ser-
vice or notification. Pursuant to Art. 33 Paragraph 1 of the Brussels I Regulation, the decision of 
the Swedish fund court must therefore be recognised without any form of proceedings, whereby 
in a case such as this one, pursuant to Art. 35 Paragraph 3 of the Brussels I Regulation the compe-
tence of the Swedish court may not be reviewed and, pursuant to Art. 36 of the Brussels I Regula-
tion, in no event may there be a review of the accuracy of the decision made in Sweden. 
3.4.4 The legal consequence in this country of the decision of the Swedish fund court is thus 
determined by Swedish law. This includes Art. 13 LLMC, in which provision "immunity" of arrests 
is laid down. The recognition of that decision in the Netherlands entails that this "immunity" also 
applies in this country. As the recognition takes place without an investigation into the accuracy 
of the decision of the Swedish fund court, it must also be assumed that, in accordance with the 
(implicit) decision, the arbitration procedure referred to … above satisfies the condition for con-
stituting a fund that legal proceedings have been brought with regard to claims subject to limita-
tion as laid down in Art. 11 LLMC. 
3.4.5 Art. 13 Paragraph 1 LLMC entails that a person who has brought a claim against the fund is 
not permitted to exercise any right relating to such claim with regard to any other assets of a 
person who constituted the fund or on whose behalf the fund was constituted. This means that 
arrests, prior to or after the constitution of the limitation fund, made by a person who brought a 
claim against the fund, lack legal effect. It ensues from this that in such case the arrests must be 
released, without the court to whom the application is made having any discretion of evaluation 
                                                             
138  The full translation is attached as an appendix to this contribution. 
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in this respect. The circumstance that in this case the arrest lacks legal effect and must be relea-
sed immediately, also means that it is not permitted to demand security in return for which the 
arrest will (might) be released. 
The facts … show that on 13 March 2003, after the limitation fund was constituted, Westereems 
arrested the "Seawheel Rhine" and that it presented its claim to the fund in October 2003. That 
Westereems filed this fund conditionally and under denial of, inter alia, the competence of the 
Swedish court does not detract from the fact of this presentation. The arrest therefore lacks legal 
effect and release thereof and return of the security given to release the arrest is therefore impe-
ratively prescribed. 
3.4.6 The above entails that the opinion of the court of appeal rests on an incorrect view regar-
ding the recognition in this country of the decision of the Swedish fund court and regarding the 
legal consequences which are attached to Art. 13 LLMC in respect of the "immunity" of arrests. 
Contrary to what the court of appeal held, in the evaluation of the claim for the return of the 
guarantees given, there is no scope for an investigation into whether or not the claim on the ba-
sis of which the arrest was made was well-founded or not. The legal complaints of the sections 
are therefore effective. 
59. In conclusion, some implications may be drawn from the above. It is clear from both 
Maersk Olie & Gas and Seawheel Rhine/Assi Eurolink that the Brussels I Regulation 44/2001 
and the Lugano Convention 1988 may assist in extending the scope of application of limita-
tion conventions such as LLMC beyond the range of their contracting states to include all EU 
member states and the states party to the Lugano Convention. In this way also the protect-
ion that a ship-owner or other beneficiary of limitation may derive from the constitution of a 
limitation fund is further enhanced. Important is also that “recognition” of the Swedish li-
mitation fund is interpreted to mean that the legal consequences of the Swedish fund in the 
Dutch jurisdiction are to be decided by Swedish law. In that way, despite the weak drafting 
















                                                             
139  In the decision of The General Grot-Rowecki by the Norwegian Supreme Court (see above footnote 134) 
the Norwegian ship’s arrest was lifted in view of the implications of the limitation fund set up in France, 




Annex I: Decision of the Maritime and Commercial Court of Copenhagen of 11 May 2005 
(The “Uno” Case) 
 
Translated by Hens Feilberg140 
 
 
Statement of Claim 
 
On the 11th July 2002 the M/S Uno, registered in Fredericia, collided with the barge, the 
Dettmer Tank 46/116, in the Kieler Channel. The collision caused the M/S Uno to sink within 
few minutes. The chief engineer died in connection with the accident. Apart from the perso-
nal injury the Dettmer Tank 46/116 was damaged and the cargo was damaged or lost. Fur-
thermore, costs were incurred in relation to salvaging of the cargo onboard, to pollution of 
bunkers and for removal of the wreck of the M/S Uno. The owner of the M/S Uno was the 
partnership, Uno, the partners of which were Erik Petersen Schmidt and Rasmus Peter 
Schmidt. A hull insurance had been taken out for the vessel with Codan A/S and an P&I Insu-
rance with Assuranceforeningen Skuld, Den Danske Afdeling. The cargo was insured with 
Tryg A/S. 
The wreck of the M/S Uno was removed according to a decision taken by Wasser- und Schif-
fahrtsdirektion Nord in Kiel (hereinafter WSN) which paid EUR 770,000 for the removal. Ha-
ving received income from the sale of the wreck etc. WSN’s claim relating to removal of the 
wreck amounted to EUR 746,528. On the 29th April 2003 WSN obtained a judgment from 
Landgericht Itzehoe for the part of the costs relating to removal of the wreck to which the 
WSN was entitled pursuant to German law, SDR 406,979. The amount appeared after WSN 
had reduced its claim following objections from Uno. In the judgment it says that in the Writ 
WSN claimed payment of EUR 746,528. After Uno had submitted an allegation on limitation 
of liability pursuant to S 487(2) of the Handelsgesetzbuch, cf. Article 6 of the 1976 Conven-
tion, WSN in principle acknowledged the limitation of liability during the final hearing on the 
8th April 2003 and withdraw the case in that respect. Uno filed a defence for non-liability for 
WSN’s claim giving various reasons. In the judgment it further says that Uno relied on its 
right to submit further limitation of liability under Danish law which was the governing law in 
the event of enforcement of the judgment. 
The court found for WSN and in that connection said that the court was not to take a deci-
sion on Uno’s allegation about limitation of liability pursuant to S 487(2) of the Handelsge-
setzbuch, cf. the provisions of the 1976 Convention. In that connection the court noted: 
 
“For the sake of completeness reference is made to the contents of discussions during the final 
hearing on the 8th April 2003. The Defendants’ additional allegations relating to possible 
limitation of liability under Danish law which applies in the event of enforcement is not 
relevant in relation to this matter…” 
 
On the 3rd July 2003 Landgericht Itzehoe endorsed the judgment of the 29th April 2003 to 
the effect that it was final and conclusive. On the 6th February 2004 the Bailiff’s Court in Fre-
dericia endorsed the judgment to the effect that it could be enforced, cf. S 4(2), cf. S 6(1) of 
the Act on the EU Judgments Convention. 
                                                             
140  Reprinted here with gracious permission of Mr. Axel Laudrup of the law firm of Gorrisen Federspiel 
Kierkegaard, of Copenhagen, Denmark 
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Then WSN asked the Bailiff’s Court to enforce the judgment. In its decision of the 13th Sep-
tember 2004 the Bailiff’s Court took into account that the 1976 Convention prevailed over 
the EU Judgments Convention, cf. Article 57 thereof. Uno had failed to appeal the judgment 
and reservations had not been made in the judgment as mentioned in S 180(1) of the Mer-
chant Shipping Act, and neither had a limitation fund been set up before the judgment 
became final and conclusive on the 3rd July 2003. Therefore, Uno cannot rely on the provi-
sion of S 178(2) of the Merchant Shipping Act and therefore, the application for execution 
should be furthered. 
The decision rendered by the Bailiff’s Court in Fredericia was appealed to the Danish High 
Court, Western Division, which rendered its decision on the 23rd February 2005. During the 
appeal case Uno submitted a primary claim for referral of the case to the Maritime and Com-
mercial Court, alternatively for the execution to be stayed. The High Court rejected the claim 
for referral to the Maritime and Commercial Court and explained that after the proceedings 
had been instituted before Landgericht Itzehoe, Uno had had the possibility of setting up a 
limitation fund before the competent German authority in accordance with Article 1 of the 
Limitation of Liability Convention. In such situation the German rules implementing the pro-
visions of Article 13 of the Convention on exclusion of other legal steps would have applied. 
However, Uno never set up such fund and then Landgericht Itzehoe found that the judgment 
was subject to Article 25 of the EU Judgments Convention and therefore, it could be enfor-
ced here in this country, cf. Article 31(1) of the Convention. Article 57 of the Judgments Con-
vention would not have changed the result as the 1976 Convention does not set out rules for 
the competence of the courts or recognition or enforcement of decisions. 
The limitation fund which Uno had now set up here in this country, see below, had been set 
up after the judgment from Landgericht Itzehoe was final and therefore, S 178(2) first sen-
tence of the Merchant Shipping Act did not prevent execution on the basis of the judgment. 
Then the decision of the Bailiff’s Court was upheld. On the 29th March 2004 based on a no-
tice from the Bailiff’s Court in Fredericia attorney Alex Laudrup on behalf of the owner of the 
M/S Uno filed a request for the setting up of a limitation fund pursuant to S 177 of the Mer-
chant Shipping Act, cf. S 234(1), to cover claims under S 175(3) of the Merchant Shipping Act. 
On the 2nd April 2004 the Maritime and Commercial Court rendered the following decision: 
 
“Based on the information made available to the court the owner of the M/S Uno may limit its 
liability pursuant to the provisions of Part 9 of the Merchant Shipping Act. Pursuant to S 175(3) 
of the Merchant Shipping Act the limitation amount has been calculated at SDR 406,979 based 
on the vessel’s gross register tonnage of 1,937 to which should be added interest from the 
11th July 2002 until the date for the setting up of the fund, cf. S 232 of the Merchant Shipping 
Act, preliminarily calculated at SDR 27,932.52 covering the period from the 11th July 2002 – 
29th March 2004, in total SDR 434,911.52 translated into DKK 3,919,727.06. In the event that a 
fund is set up an amount to cover costs of administration of the fund should be added and 
further legal costs and costs for any further claims for interest, cf. S 234(2) of the Merchant 
Shipping Act. The amount is on a preliminary basis set at DKK 100,000. The court approves the 
security offered by the owner’s P&I insurers in the form explained in the draft. then it is held 
that The amount of the limitation fund which the owner of the M/S Uno has requested with 
reference to the sinking on the 11th July 2002 is set at DKK 3,919,727.06 plus an amount 
pursuant to S 234(2) of the Merchant Shipping Act of DKK 100,000. The Court accepts the 
security offered by the owner of the M/S Uno in the form described in the draft of the 29th 
March 2004”.  
 




“As the security offered has now been completed the limitation fund requested by the part-
nership of Uno by corresponding owner Rasmus Peter Schmidt and Assuranceforeningen Skuld 
is now considered having been set up, cf. the decision rendered by the Maritime and 
Commercial Court on the 2nd April 2004. It is held that: With reference to the limitation fund 
of SDR 406,979 plus interest from the 11th July 2002 – 5th April 2004 plus an additional 
amount of DKK 100,000 pursuant to S 234(2) of the Merchant Shipping Act requested by the 
owner of the M/S Uno in relation to the collision on the 11th July 2002 with the barge, the 
Dettmer Tank 46/116, in the north-eastern part of the Kieler Channel is considered set up”. 
 
On the 14th April 2004 the Maritime and Commercial Court inserted an announcement 
about the setting up of the fund in the Danish Official Gazette. The deadline for filing of 
claims was the 1st July 2004. The announcement further said that separate proceedings on 
claims subject to limitation of liability or whether the persons for the benefit of whom the 
fund had been set up were entitled to limit their liability could not be instituted here in this 
country after the limitation fund had been set up, cf. S 177(3) of the Merchant Shipping Act. 
On the 11th June 2004 WSN filed its claim with the fund. The claim was for SDR 406,979 plus 
5 per cent interest annually from the 4th September 2002 (claim no. 1). Other claims from 
Tryg and Umweltschutzamt, Itzehoe, were filed on the 29th June 2004. 
As a result of a dispute between WSN and Uno among others as to whether WSN’s 
claim should be further limited than in the decision rendered by Landgericht Itzehoe a 
hearing was set on the 6th October 2004 for discussion of the following questions; 
 
1. whether the fund had been validly set up; 
2. whether the claim made by WSN could be limited; 
3. which claims could be filed with the limitation fund (the full amount, the judgment 
amount or the difference between the first two amounts). 
 
After exchange of pleadings the final hearing took place on the 8th and 16th March 2005 for 
discussion of the said questions. At that time the following claims had been made: 
1. WSN’s claim relating to removal of wreck, SDR 406,979. In the registration it says 
that it is not an expression of acceptance of Uno’s right to further limit the amount which 
WSN was awarded by Landgericht Itzehoe. WSN explicitly objected against Uno being 
entitled to further limitation of liability than expressed in the judgment. Furthermore, WSN 
held that Uno could not prevent execution by setting up a limitation fund in Denmark in 
connection with the execution. In that connection it was stated that pursuant to the 
Convention national law could only allow limitation where the limitation fund had already 
been set up prior to the judgment being final and conclusive. 
In a letter of the 28th June 2004 received on the 29th June 2004 WSN’s 
attorney explained that he had noted that he should actually have filed WSN’s full claim 
which was EUR 929,869.65. The claim was maintained in WSN’s Written Pleadings of the 
26th November 2004. In the Written Pleadings WSN claimed further EUR 49,443.29 which 
was the remainder of the claim from Wasser- und Schiffahrtamt Brunsbüttel and a claim 
of EUR 73,459.30 by the same for costs relating to the collision. Then WSN’s total claim 
amounted to EUR 1,052,772.20. The claim was later reduced by EUR 49,443.29 after 
Staatliches Umweltamt Itzehoe had waived the claim against WSN. Furthermore, the claim 




2. Staatliche Umweltamt Itzehoe’s claim of EUR 109,443.29 for cleaning up costs. The 
claim was assigned to Interessentskabet Uno and Skuld. The claim has not been contested by 
WSN. 
3. Claim relating to damage to cargo etc. of EUR 34,707.22. The claim has 
been assigned to Interessentskabet Uno and Skuld. The claim has not been contested by 
WSN. 
 
The Decision of the Court 
 
1. If the fund is established properly, and 2. if the claim proved by WSN can be reduced. Pur-
suant to Section 177 of the Danish Merchant Shipping Act, a limitation fund can be establi-
shed before the Maritime and Commercial Court of Copenhagen, if an arrest is requested in 
this country, legal proceedings are instituted; or other legal steps are requested to be taken 
in consequence of claims which according to their kind can be limited. According to the wor-
ding of this provision, the background for it, and the purpose of it, cf. Report No. 924/1981 
on limitation of the liability of the owner, it must be assumed that a request for execution of 
a judgment as the present judgment of 29 April 2003 delivered by Landgericht Itzehoe, 
which concerns a claim that, according to its kind, can be limited, could form the basis of the 
establishment of a limitation fund in Denmark. An opposite interpretation would lead to the 
unacceptable result that the scope of the applicability of the rules on limitation of liability 
through the establishment of a fund could be eliminated to a non-immaterial extent, which 
would contradict the purpose of the 1976-Convention and the 1996-Protocol. 
The fact that a legally binding judgment is available from another EU-country does 
not prevent limitation of liability in the establishment of a limitation fund 
in Denmark. Pursuant to Article 57 of the Judgments Convention, this provision does not 
involve conventions adopted or to be adopted by contracting states, and which in specific 
respects provide for jurisdiction and also for recognition and execution of judicial decisions. 
The 1976-Convention contains in Articles 11-13 further provisions as to the establishment of 
a limitation fund, the distribution of the fund, and the exclusion of other legal steps after the 
establishment of a limitation fund, including the prevention of arrest. In accordance with the 
indication of the Danish Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs in connection with tabling 
of a motion for the amendment of the Danish Merchant Shipping Act (the passing of the 
1996-Protocol to the Convention on Global Limitation of 1976 etc., Bill No. 165, 
parliamentary session 1998-99), these provisions may, however, imply that the 1976-
Convention and the 1999-Protocol take precedence over the Judgments Convention, cf. 
Article 57 (1) of the Judgments Convention. 
The same result is also supported by reference to the judgment of the Judgments 
Convention of 14 October 2004 in the matter of Maersk Olie & Gas A/S vs. Firma de Haan 
and W. de Boer (C-39/02), which, inter alia, establishes that a request from the owner to the 
competent court in a state as to the establishment of a limitation fund indicating a specific 
claimant and an action in another state from the claimant against the owner did not imply 
pendent elite, cf. Article 21 of the Judgments Convention. The court furthermore provided 
that an action for damages and a request for the establishment of a limitation fund do not 
have the same subject matter. This must lead to the fact that the limitation fund 
established on 5 April 2004 is also established properly compared to WSN’s claim. 
The court can adopt that it is of no importance to the question of justification of the 
establishment of the fund of 5 April 2004 that Uno did not make certain reservations before 
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Landgericht Itzehoe pursuant to Section 180 (1) (2) of the Danish Merchant Shipping Act as 
to other claims, merely because according to the information received, there would not be 
raised any other claims against Uno in Germany on account of the wreck removal for which a 
separate fund is established in Germany. A reservation in the judgment delivered by 
Landgericht Itzehoe would consequently be unfounded according to German law. 
 
The Question of Prolongation 
 
WSN is not prevented from pleading that the provisions of the 1996-Protocol, cf. Part 9 of 
the Danish Merchant Shipping Act, shall apply to the Limitation Fund of 5 April 2004. The 
1996-Protocol establishes in Article 9 (3) that the 1976-Convention as amended in the 
Protocol only applies to claims that arise in connection with events which happen after the 
Protocol takes effect for each state participating in the Protocol. Pursuant to Act No. 228 of 
21 April 1999 which carried the 1996- Protocol into effect in Denmark, the amendment to 
the Act came into effect according to the decisions of the Minister of Economic and Business 
Affairs as it is furthermore stated in Section 2 of the amendment to the Act. It is evident 
from the explanatory notes to this provision that the provision “contains an authority of the 
Minister of Economic and Business Affairs to determine the date for the commencement of 
the Act and an authority to put the Act into force successively. The provision makes it possible 
for the Act to be put into force, when the Protocol comes into force”. Furthermore, it is 
evident from the explanatory notes that the provision makes it possible for provisions of 
higher limitation for damages to passengers based on the 1996-Protocol to be put into force 
sooner than the other provisions, and also before the 1996-Protocol came into force. This is 
possible due to the fact that the 1976-Convention made it possible to fix a higher limitation 
ceiling over damages to passengers. In Section 2 of the motion for the Act on amendment of 
the Danish Merchant Shipping Act or in the explanatory notes to it, there is no basis for in-
tending also to put the provisions on limitation for other things than damages to passengers 
into force, i.e. obtain legal effects of events which took place before the time mentioned in 
the Protocol, which proved to be on 13 May 2004. 
The amended rules came into force on 1 January 2004 as prescribed by the Minister 
of Economic and Business Affairs in Regulation No. 782 of 5 September 2003. Accordingly, it 
is presumed that by doing so, it is intended to have the amended provisions relating to other 
things than damages to passengers be put into force, i.e. obtain application of events occur-
ring after the time stated in the Protocol. So, it is properly established that the limitation 
fund of 5 April 2004 was established with an amount pursuant to the 1976-Convention. The 
rules in Part 9 of the Danish Merchant Shipping Act containing the provisions of the 1996-
Protocol shall apply to all events, where limitation of liability is claimed before a Danish 
court. However, the rules in Part 9 a, which contain the provisions of the 1976-Con vention, 
shall apply to 1. if it is requested, and 2. if the claimant is domiciled or has headquarters in a 
state bound by the 1976- Convention, but not by the 1996-Protocol. These provisions are 
intended, as it is evident from the explanatory notes to the provision, to solve some of the 
legal disputes, which could occur as a consequence of some states having affiliated with the 
1996-Protocol, while others stick to the 1976-Convention. The provisions are of no impor-
tance to the question of the application of the 1996- Protocol in respect of time, which 
question must be decided according to Article 9 (3) of the Protocol and the nation-wide 
commencement provisions. As to the reasons stated by Uno, it is moreover endorsed that 
Denmark was not bound by the 1996-Protocol at the time of the establishment of the limi-
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tation fund in accordance with Uno’s petition. According to Article 11 of the 1996- Protocol, 
it comes into force 90 days after the date, when 10 states have consented to be bound by 
the Protocol. The requirement for the approval of the 10 states was fulfilled on 13 February 
2004, for which reason the Protocol came into force on 13 May 2004, from which date Den-
mark, which had ratified the Protocol on 12 April 2002, was bound by it. Denmark was not as 
such bound by the 1996-Protocol from 1 January 2004 irrespective of the fact that the 
amendment of the Act was put into force by virtue of Regulation No. 782 of 5 September 
2003, which indicated to come into force on 1 January 2004. The two mentioned conditions 
of the application of the 1976-Convention were as such fulfilled at the time of the establish-
ment of the limitation fund. Therefore, the court has to agree with Uno that WSN must re-
cognise that the claim proved in the fund has to be limited pursuant to the rules on limita-
tion of liability valid at the time of damage. 
3. Which claims can be proved in the limitation fund (the whole claim, the 
judgment amount or the difference between the two first amounts). According to the 
indications of the parties during the closing speech, the Court finds it appropriate to make a 
decision on the questions of partial renunciation of the requested amount and on the 
question of foreclosure of the proved claim of 26 November 2004 of Landgericht 
Itzehoe. WSN’s claim can, see above, be tabulated as follows (except for entry a, which is in 
EUR): 
 
Date of Notification:  
Amount: Comments: 
A 11 June 2004 406,979 SDR 
B 29 June 2004 929,869.65 Replaces a 
c 26 November 2004 49,443.29 Waived 
e 26 November 2004 73,459.30 Brunsbüttel, costs 
f - 23,472.00 Sale of wreck 
Claim in total 979,856.95 
 
As to entry b, the question is whether WSN as a consequence of the notification of its claim 
in the limitation fund has waived to prove a part of its original total claim. WSN has with-
drawn the case instituted at Landgericht Itzehoe in respect of part of the claim amounting to 
EUR 746,528, which exceeded the limitation amount pursuant to Section 487 (2) of Handels-
gesetzbuch combined with Article 6 of the 1976-Convention, which amounts to SDR 406,979, 
a difference according to the rate of exchange on 6 May 2005 of DKK 2,010,339. The court 
finds that WSN’s waiver of this differential claim against Uno during the legal proceedings at 
Landgericht Itzehoe ought to imply that WSN is prevented from advancing the whole claim 
in the limitation fund. It serviced no purpose in maintainning the whole claim, as there were 
and are probably no grounds for assuming that the whole claim was unfeasible before a Ger-
man court. At this point, Uno had not quite yet taken steps to establish a limitation fund. A 
failure to make reservations as to the possibility of advancing the claim in another manner 
should under the prevailing circumstances not prevent WSN from advancing the whole 
amount in the limitation fund. It is advanced that recognition of Uno’s whole claim would 
imply that a part of the settlements entered into by Uno has affected the wrong prerequisi-
tes that solely the amount awarded WSN by Landgericht Itzehoe would be included as a 
claim in the fund. In connection with this, it may be remarked that the contents and prere-
quisites of these settlements have not been further stated. Consequently that is why the 
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consideration can only be attributed to a limited extent. In addition to this, WSN has not par-
ticipated in the settlements and does seem to have received indications if these are made on 
the assumption of claims of a certain magnitude on WSN’s part. Consequently, WSN ought 
not to bear the risk of prerequisites of the settlement. 
Inasmuch as Uno has maintained that WSN’s part of its claim in the amount of EUR 
73,459.30, proved on 26 November 2004, has been proved too late, it must be mentioned 
that the claim has been proved, before the distribution of the fund has been tried before a 
court in the first instance, cf. Section 238 of the Danish Merchant Shipping Act combined 
with Sections 235, 238, and 245. Thereby, the claim was proved prior to barring of claims. 
A considerable amount of exhibits have been produced to the court as to the further 
statement of WSN’s claim. Uno has contended the statement as insufficiently substantiated. 
A further review of the entries recorded was not performed. The question as to the further 
statement of the proved claims is not included in the subjects of the fixed part legal procee-
dings. The court does, however, not find it necessary in connection with this present part 
judgment to make a decision on the documentation for and on the statement of the proved 
claims. The question as to legal costs is postponed till the final distribution of the fund. 
 
IT IS HELD THAT 
 
Wasser- und Schiffahrtsdirektion Nord must recognise that the claims proved in the fund 
have to be limited pursuant to the rules on limitation of liability of the Danish Merchant 
Shipping Act valid at the time of damage. In making up the proved claims, it ought not be ta-
ken into consideration the fact that Wasser- under Schiffahrtsdirektion Nord withdrew the 
case instituted at Landgericht Itzehoe as regards the part of the claim amounting to EUR 
746,528, which exceeded the limitation amount pursuant to Section 487 (2) of Handelsge-
setzbuch combined with Article 6 of the 1976-Convention. The claim proved by Wasser- und 
Schiffahrtsdirektion Nord on 26 November 2004 amounting to EUR 73,459.30 is not exclu-


















Annex II: Decision of the First Chamber of the Hoge Raad of 29 September 2006, No. 
C05/147 HRJ MH/MK 
 
Translated by Frank Smeele 
 
Judgment 
in the matter of: 
the legal person under Swedish law 
1. B&N NORDSJÖFRAKT AB, 
having its registered office in Skärham, Sweden, 
2. NORTHSEA SHIPPING AB, 
having its registered office in Kyrkesund, Sweden, 
PLAINTIFFS in the cassation appeal, 





having its registered office in Delfzijl, 
DEFENDANT in the cassation appeal, 
attorney: M.V. Polak. 
 
1. The proceedings in the fact-finding courts 
 
By two writs of 26 March 2003, the plaintiffs in the cassation appeal – hereafter called: B&N 
and Northsea – summoned the State of the Netherlands, the Ministry of Transport, Public 
Works and Water Management (North Sea Directorate, having its registered office in Rijs-
wijk), having its registered office in The Hague and the defendant in the cassation appeal – 
hereafter individually called: the State and Westereems – to appear in preliminary relief 
proceedings before the preliminary relief judge of the district court of Rotterdam and 
requested by judgment which was immediately enforceable at any time upon presentation 




1. an order that Westereems return the two guarantees of Alandia and The Swedish Club 
given on the part of Northsea, whereby failure to comply was to be subject to a fine to be 
fairly determined; 
2. an order that the State return the guarantee given to it in respect of Northsea, whereby 






1. an order that Westereems return the two guarantees of Alandia and The Swedish Club gi-
ven to it on the part of Northsea in return for B&N and Northsea furnishing a proper gua-
rantee in the amount of the value of the "Seawheel Rhine" of US$ 1,900,000, whereby 
failure to comply was to be subject to a fine to be fairly determined; 
2. an order that the State return the guarantee given to it in return for B&N and Northsea 
furnishing a proper guarantee in the amount of the value of the "Seawheel Rhine" of US$ 
1,900,000, whereby failure to comply was to be subject to a fine to be fairly determined. 
 
The State and Westereems contested both the primary and the alternative claims. By 
judgment of 24 April 2003 the preliminary relief judge dismissed the claims of B&N and 
Northsea and ordered B&N and Northsea to pay the costs of these proceedings. B&N and 
Northsea filed an appeal against the judgment before the court of appeal of The Hague. By 
judgment of 15 March 2005 the court of appeal affirmed the judgment against which the 
appeal was filed and ordered B&N and Northsea to pay the costs of the appeal, which 
judgment was immediately enforceable. The judgment of the court of appeal is attached to 
this judgment. 
 
2. The proceedings in the cassation appeal 
 
B&N and Northsea filed a cassation appeal against the judgment of the court of appeal in the 
case against Westereems. The cassation summons is attached to this judgment and forms 
part hereof. Westereems requested that the appeal be dismissed. The case was argued on 
behalf of the parties by their attorneys and on behalf of Westereems by E.D. van Geuns, 
attorney with the Supreme Court. 
The conclusion of the Advocate-General L. Strikwerda is to quash the contested judgment 
and for adjudication of the case by the Supreme Court as set out under 25 of the conclusion. 
Westereems' attorney responded to said conclusion by letters of 1 June 2006 and 8 June 
2006. 
 
3. Evaluation of the appeal 
 
3.1 The following can be assumed in the cassation appeal. 
 
(i) On or around 25 January 2003 there was a collision on the North Sea to the north of Ter-
schelling, outside of the territorial waters on a deep-water route on the Netherlands 
continental shelf – the Friesland Junction – between the sea-going vessel "Seawheel Rhine" 
and the sea-going vessel "Assi Eurolink". The "Assi Eurolink" sunk virtually immediately as a 




(ii) The "Seawheel Rhine" belongs to Northsea, based in Sweden, which chartered the ship to 
B&N, also based in Sweden. The "Assi Eurolink" belongs to Westereems, based in the 
Netherlands. 
 
(iii) On 10 and 11 February 2003 Westereems summoned both Northsea and B&N to appear 
before the district court of Groningen to compensate hull and other damage connected with 
the loss of the "Assi Eurolink", and any wreck salvage costs which it may have to pay the 
Netherlands State. 
 
(iv) In response, on 19 February 2003 Northsea instituted arbitration proceedings against 
B&N before the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce in Sweden. In 
said appeal Northsea claims a declaratory judgment from the arbitrators that B&N is bound 
to indemnify it against all claims brought against Northsea in connection with the collision. 
(v) On 24 February 2003 B&N then filed a limitation petition with the court in Stockholm, 
Sweden, which was granted by decision one day or a few days later and which fixed B&N's 
liability in advance at € 2,255,218.62 (SEK 20,791,629 / SDR 1,800,093), for which amount 
B&N had already constituted a fund before the relevant court by means of the giving guaran-
tees by The Swedish Club and Försäkingsaktiebolaget Alandia / the P&I Club and the hull 
insurer of the "Seawheel Rhine". 
 
(vi) Northsea and Westereems are referred to as possible creditors in the limitation petition. 
Westereems was not given the opportunity to be heard prior to the decision. Sweden has no 
regulation that possible creditors must be informed as to a petition to constitute a fund. 
 
(vii) On 13 March 2003 Westereems arrested the "Seawheel Rhine" in Rotterdam. The arrest 
was lifted upon the giving of two guarantees – one of SDR 2,628,375, on 20 March 2003, by 
the Swedish Club (for wreck salvaging) and one of SDR 1,800,093, on 21 March 2003, by 
Försäkingsaktiebolaget Alandia (for the property fund), both in the name of Northsea. 
 
(viii) Westereems appealed against the decision of the Swedish court set out under (v). The 
SVEA Court in Stockholm dismissed this appeal on 26 June 2003. 
 
(ix) In October 2003 Westereems presented its claim to the limitation fund constituted in 
Sweden, albeit conditionally and under denial of – inter alia – the competence of the 
Swedish court. 
 
(x) Following the petitions presented by Westereems in this respect, the court of Stockholm 
considered by decision of 29 April 2004 that the previous decision on constitution of the 
fund was not of a provisional nature and that, if Westereems wished to argue that its claims 
are not eligible for limitation in Sweden, or that the fund does not apply to costs of wreck 
36 
 
salvaging, or must be dealt with under Dutch law, it must institute a "limitation action", 
proceedings on the merits, before the Swedish limitation court. 
 
(xi) B&N and Northsea have in the meantime instituted such a "limitation action" against 
Westereems in Sweden. 
 
(xii) The Netherlands and Sweden are both parties to the Convention on Limitation of 
Liability for Maritime Claims of 19 November 1976, Trb. 1980, 23, hereafter: the Convention. 
Contrary to the Netherlands, Sweden did not make use of the option to exclude applicability 
of the Convention with regard to the costs of wreck salvaging. Sweden has no separate 
wreck fund. If B&N and Northsea had filed a limitation petition in the Netherlands, in 
addition to the property fund they would also have had to constitute a wreck fund in the 
amount of € 3,329,585.79 (SDR 2,628,375.00). 
 
3.2 Arts. 11 and 13 of the Convention read, insofar as relevant here: 
 
Article 11 
1. Any person alleged to be liable may constitute a fund with the Court or other competent au-
thority in any State Party in which legal proceedings are instituted in respect of claims subject 




1. Where a limitation fund has been constituted in accordance with Article 11, any person ha-
ving made a claim against the fund shall be barred from exercising any right in respect of such 
claim against any other assets of a person by or on behalf of whom the fund has been constitu-
ted.  
2. After a limitation fund has been constituted in accordance with Article 11, any ship or other 
property, belonging to a person on behalf of whom the fund has been constituted, which has 
been arrested or attached within the jurisdiction of a State Party for a claim which may be rai-
sed against the fund, or any security given, may be released by order of the Court or other 
competent authority of such State. How-ever, such release shall always be ordered if the 
limitation fund has been constituted: (…)  
3. The rules of paragraphs 1 and 2 shall apply only if the claimant may bring a claim against the 
limitation fund before the Court administering that fund and the fund is actually available and 
freely transferable in respect of that claim. 
 
3.3.1 As set out in 1, B&N and Northsea's primary claim before the preliminary relief judge of 
the district court was for Westereems to be ordered to return the guarantees which were 
given on behalf of Northsea to release Westereems' arrest of the "Seawheel Rhine", 
whereby failure to comply was to be subject to a fairly determined fine. Insofar as relevant 
in the cassation appeal, B&N and Northsea based this claim – in short – on the ground that 
the decision of the Swedish court, whereby B&N was given leave to constitute a limitation 
fund in Sweden, must, pursuant to the Brussels I Regulation, be recognised and that the 




3.3.2 Westereems has contested the claim and presented the following arguments, inter 
alia, in this respect. The Swedish fund was not constituted in accordance with Art. 11 of the 
Convention, as Westereems, by filing the proceedings against B&N and Northsea before the 
district court of Groningen, had instituted legal proceedings as referred to in Art. 11 well 
before the constituting of the limitation fund in Sweden, so that the Swedish arbitration 
proceedings cannot be seen as legal proceedings as refer-red to in Art. 11 of the Convention 
and Art. 13 does not apply. The Brussels I Regulation does not apply as the Convention, 
which contains a special jurisdiction clause in Art. 11, derogates from the Brussels I 
Regulation. Moreover, even if applicability of the Brussels I Regulation were to be assumed, 
the Swedish limitation decision should not be recognised under the Regulation as it was 
made ex parte. 
 
3.3.3 The preliminary relief judge dismissed the claims of B&N and Northsea. The 
preliminary relief judge was of the opinion that – in short – the arbitration proceedings 
which Northsea brought against B&N in Sweden cannot be deemed a "legal proceeding" as 
referred to in Art. 11 of the Convention, so that the Swedish court did not have jurisdiction 
to decide on the limitation petition of B&N and Westereems does not have to return the 
guarantees on the basis of Art. 13 of the Convention. 
 
3.3.4 In the disputed judgment in the appeal filed by B&N and Northsea, the court of appeal 
affirmed the judgment of the preliminary relief judge. Toward this end the court of appeal, 
in short, considered the following. Appeal grounds I-III relate to the question whether the 
decision of the Swedish fund court is eligible for recognition (and enforcement) (point 5). 
Northsea wants recognition of the Swedish decision because of what it believes is the 
related legal consequence pursuant to Swedish law and pursuant to Art. 13 of the 
Convention, that the guarantees given on its behalf must be returned (points 6 and 7). The 
legal opinions presented by the parties do not indicate that under Swedish law this legal 
consequence is attached to the decision of the Swedish court (points 7.2 and 7.3). Nor does 
the legal consequence mandatorily ensue from Art. 13 of the Convention, as this article lays 
down as a prerequisite that the limitation fund must be constituted in accordance with Art. 
11, which condition has not been satisfied here, as Northsea had already been summoned 
before the district court of Groningen when it instituted arbitration proceedings in Sweden 
and it cannot rely on proceedings in which it is itself the plaintiff (points 7.4 and 7.5). Should, 
contrary to the above, the legal consequence claimed by Northsea be attached to the 
Swedish decision under Swedish law, then such decision with regard to said legal 
consequence cannot be recognised in this country, as the decision with regard to said legal 
consequence has not been or has not been able to be the subject of a defended action in 
which Westereems was able to contest the competence of the Swedish court, B&N's right to 
constitute a fund in Sweden and Northsea's right to rely thereon. The contrary does not 
ensue from the decision of the SVEA Court in Stockholm; said decision does not encompass a 
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substantive evaluation of the objections and only refers to the proceedings on the merits 
(point 8). In the opinion of the court of appeal, as it had not been summarily demonstrated 
that the claims for which the arrest was made and for the release of which the guarantees 
were given were unfounded, the claim for return of the guarantees was therefore rightly dis-
missed (point 9). 
 
3.4.1 Sections I.1, I.4, II and IV are suitable for being dealt with jointly. They support the 
argument that the opinion of the court of appeal fails to note that the decision of the 
Swedish fund court – mentioned above in 3.1 under (v) – must be recognised in this country 
and that this entails that the "immunity" of the arrests referred to in Art. 13 of the 
Convention also extends to the Netherlands, so that the arrest which was made, after the 
limitation fund had been constituted, by a person who had presented a claim on the fund, 
lacks legal consequence on the basis of the first paragraph of Art. 13 of the Convention. 
According to said sections, the court of appeal therefore wrongly did not order the release of 
the security imperatively prescribed in Art. 13 of the Convention for this case. 
 
3.4.2 Where the Convention does not itself include any arrangement in this respect, the 
recognition and enforcement in this country of the decision of the Swedish fund court 
regarding the limitation petition is governed by the provisions of the Brussels I Regulation. 
 
3.4.3 The aforementioned decision of the Swedish court to constitute the limitation fund is a 
decision as referred to in Art. 32 of the Brussels I Regulation. The fact that the decision was 
made ex parte does not detract from this (cf. – subject to the Brussels Convention – ECJ 14 
October 2004, case C-39/02 (Maersk/De Haan), sources in the conclusion of the Advocate-
General under 12). 
As ensues from the aforementioned judgment of the European Court of Justice, 
recognition of a decision to constitute a fund to limit liability without prior notice to the 
relevant creditor, even if this creditor has filed an appeal contesting the competence of the 
court which makes the decision, cannot be refused in this country on the basis of Art. 34, 
point 2 of the Brussels I Regulation, provided this decision was served on or notified to the 
defendant in a regular and timely manner. The latter is the case in these proceedings, now 
that – as has been set out above in 3.1 under (viii) – it has been established that Westereems 
filed an appeal against this decision before the SVEA Court in Stockholm, which assumes 
such service or notification. Pursuant to Art. 33 Paragraph 1 of the Brussels I Regulation, the 
decision of the Swedish fund court must therefore be recognised without any form of 
proceedings, whereby in a case such as this one, pursuant to Art. 35 Paragraph 3 of the 
Brussels I Regulation the competence of the Swedish court may not be reviewed and, 
pursuant to Art. 36 of the Brussels I Regulation, in no event may there be a review of the 




3.4.4 The legal consequence in this country of the decision of the Swedish fund court is thus 
determined by Swedish law. This includes Art. 13 of the Convention, in which provision "im-
munity" of arrests is laid down. The recognition of that decision in the Netherlands entails 
that this "immunity" also applies in this country. As the recognition takes place without an 
investigation into the accuracy of the decision of the Swedish fund court, it must also be 
assumed that, in accordance with the (implicit) decision, the arbitration procedure referred 
to in 3.1 under (iv) above satisfies the condition for constituting a fund that legal 
proceedings have been brought with regard to claims subject to limitation as laid down in 
Art. 11 of the Convention. 
 
3.4.5 Art. 13 Paragraph 1 of the Convention entails that a person who has brought a claim 
against the fund is not permitted to exercise any right relating to such claim with regard to 
any other assets of a person who constituted the fund or on whose behalf the fund was 
constituted. This means that arrests, prior to or after the constitution of the limitation fund, 
made by a person who brought a claim against the fund, lack legal effect. It ensues from this 
that in such case the arrests must be released, without the court to whom the application is 
made having any discretion of evaluation in this respect. The circumstance that in this case 
the arrest lacks legal effect and must be released immediately, also means that it is not 
permitted to demand security in return for which the arrest will (might) be released. 
The facts set out in 3.1 under (vii) and (ix) above show that on 13 March 2003, after 
the limitation fund was constituted, Westereems arrested the "Seawheel Rhine" and that it 
presented its claim to the fund in October 2003. That Westereems filed this fund 
conditionally and under denial of, inter alia, the competence of the Swedish court does not 
detract from the fact of this presentation. The arrest therefore lacks legal effect and release 
thereof and return of the security given to release the arrest is therefore imperatively 
prescribed. 
 
3.4.6 The above entails that the opinion of the court of appeal rests on an incorrect view 
regarding the recognition in this country of the decision of the Swedish fund court and 
regarding the legal consequences which are attached to Art. 13 of the Convention in respect 
of the "immunity" of arrests. Contrary to what the court of appeal held, in the evaluation of 
the claim for the return of the guarantees given, there is no scope for an investigation into 
whether or not the claim on the basis of which the arrest was made was well-founded or 
not. The legal complaints of the sections are therefore effective. 
 
3.5 With this state of affairs, the other (alternative) complaints of section I and section III 
need not be discussed. 
 
3.6 The Supreme Court can decide this matter itself. It ensues from the above that the 
disputed judgment cannot be maintained. Appeal grounds I-III directed against the judgment 
of the preliminary relief judge are well-founded. The judgment of the preliminary relief judge 
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must be quashed. In the fact-finding instance Westereems presented the defence that the 
claim for return of the guarantees fails on the basis of the specific conditions agreed by the 
parties in the guarantee agreements on which the guarantees must be returned. As 
considered in 3.4.5 above, the arrest lacks all legal effect and it is not permitted to demand 
security for the release of such arrest. The defence, which is also based on the view that the 
guarantees were intended to release the arrest, thus fails. The primary claim against 




The Supreme Court: 
quashes the judgment of the court of appeal of The Hague of 15 March 2005; 
quashes the judgment of the preliminary relief judge of the district court of Rotterdam of 24 
April 2003; 
orders Westereems to return the two guarantees given to it on behalf of Northsea of Försä-
kingsaktiebolaget Alandia and the Swedish Club, within two working days after service of this 
judgment, whereby failure to comply is subject to a fine of € 50,000 for every day or part of a 
day that Westereems fails to comply; 
orders Westereems to pay the costs of the proceedings, fixed up to the date of this 
judgment on the part of B&N and Northsea: 
- in first instance at € 991.16; 
- in appeal at € 2,995.20; 
- in cassation appeal at € 457.78 in disbursements and at € 2,600 in salary. 
 
This judgment was passed by the vice-president D.H. Beukenhorst as president and the 
judges O. de Savornin Lohman, A.M.J. van Buchem-Spapens, W.A.M. van Schendel and 
W.D.H. Asser, and pronounced in public by judge E.J. Numann on 29 September 2006. 
 
Issued as an original copy by me, Court Clerk of the Supreme Court of the Netherlands on 29 
September 2006 on behalf of the plaintiffs in the cassation appeal. 
 
 
